

THE JESUITS GOSPEL,

According to

Saint Ignatius Loiola.

WHEREIN

Their Impious Doctrines against the Christian Faith,

Their Pernitious Maxims against Christian Princes,

AND

**Their Unjust Practices destructive to all Humane
Society,**

**Contrary to the SACRED SCRIPTURES, the LAWS of
GOD, and Right Reason, are declared.**

Veni gladium mittere non Pacem:

Sicut Serpentes.

LONDON,

Printed for Norman Nelson, at Grays-Inn Gate in

Holboorn. MDC LXXIX.

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THE Jesuits Gospel, According to Saint Ignatius Loiola.

CHAP. I.

Of the Pope.

1. **T**He Bishop of Rome is God. *Dist. 96. Ca. satis evidentem.*
2. The Pope is no Man. *Lib. 1. Sext. de electione tit. 6. c. fundament.* It's true of Pope Joas.
in gloss.
3. The Pope is neither God nor Man. *In. Prolog. Clement in glossatore.*
4. It's lawful for no man to imagin or practise to transgress the Precepts of Apostolical See. *Dist. 20. c. nulli Dist. 12. 22.*
5. An Heretick is he who is not obedient to the Pope's Decrees. *Ibidem.*
6. The Pope is Lord of all Temporalities upon Earth. *Lib. 3. Sext. tit. 16. c. Periculoso.*
7. No man ought to say unto the Pope, Why dost thou thus, or thus? *Decret. lib. 7. c. 5. gloss.*
8. No mortal man may sit in Judgment upon the Pope. *Dist. 40. c. si Papa. c. non omnes. gloss.*
9. It's lawful for no Creature to call into question the Judgment of the Apostolical See, or delay the Sentence thereof. *Caus. 17. q. 4. c. memini.*
10. The Pope may dispense against the Apostles. *Dist. 34. Col. in gloss. Dist. 82. c. Presbyter in gloss. Caus. 15. q. 6. c. auctoritatem in gloss.*
11. The Pope hath Celestial arbitrement, *lib. 1. Decret. Greg. c. 5.*
12. The Pope's Will is a Law. *Ibidem.*
13. The Pope may cause an unjust Decree to be received for just. *Ibid.*
14. All Nations and Kingdoms are under the Pope's Jurisdiction. *Ext. Com. tit. 1. super gentes.*
15. God hath delivered over unto the Pope the power and rule of Heaven and Earth. *Ext. Jo. 22. tit. 5. dist. 22. c. omnes.*
16. The whole World is the Pope's right and inheritance; therefore if Emperours or Kings have at any time given any Privileges or Lands, to any Pope, (as they say Constantine did to Sylvester) they did not give that which was their own to give; but only restore that which was formerly taken from them by tyranny and injustice. *Aug. de Anconade potestate Ecclesiastica, part. 1. q. 1. ar. 1.*
17. The Pope is above all Principalities and Power, and every name that is named, not only in this World, but in that which is to come: and that he is the Sun and Light of the World. *B. 20. de Roman Pontific. ca. 6. p. 56, 57, 58, 66. Eph. 1. 21.*

True of Pope
Clement the 7th,
when he was
cooped up by
Charles the 5th
in the Castle
of St. Angelo;
then *Papa non
potest errare.*

18. The Pope hath an Almighty Infallibility, and cannot err. *Sanch. Suarez. G. Valentia.*

CHAP. II.

Of the Papal Grandeur, or Greatness.

1. **W**hen the Emperour goeth to be crowned by the Pope, he, as soon as he espyeth his Holiness, is to kneel and worship him bare-headed, then to approach nearer and kiss his feet; and the same is to be done by the Empress when she is crowned: *Sacrarum Ceremoniarum, lib. 1. fo. 22. edit. Rom.*
2. When the Emperour is crowned at the publique Procession before the people, he is to go to the Pope's House, and then to hold the Stirrup till his Holiness mounts on Horseback; and then like a Lacquey must he hold the Pope's Rosinant some wayes by the reins. *Ibidem, fo. 25, 26.*
3. This piece of Service must the Emperour, King or Chief Potentate perform when the Pope is chosen, in his Procession to the *Lateran Church.* *Ibidem.*
4. If there be two Kings present, then the Pope doth command the one of them on his right side, the other on his left must lead his Palfray along by the Bridle. *Ibid. 17.* And therefore when *Frederick Barbarossa* held the left Stirrup of his Holiness as he alighted from his Horse, his Holiness Pope *Adrian the Fourth* took great displeasure; because he held the left Stirrup of his Saddle and not the right; which if he had intended to have honoured us, he would have held the right, which ought to have been holden. *Funcii Chronicon. Bar. de vita Pontific.*
5. The best Lay-man though he be Emperour or King, must carry Water for the Pope to wash his hands in, and must carry up the first Dish of meat to his Table. *Ibidem, fo. 20.*
6. If the Pope will not ride on Horseback, but be carried in a Chair, then four of the greatest Princes, yea though the Emperour be one of them, must put their Shoulders to the said Chair, and so carry him some space: *Ibidem, lib. 1. fo. 17.*
7. By this all the Emperours, Kings and Princes of the Earth must learn to obey, fear and reverence him.
8. When his Holiness is Elected and carried to the *Lateran*, he takes up as much Money as he can in his hand, and throws it amongst the People, saying, *Silver and Gold have I none, but such as I have, give I thee.* *Ibid. fo. 17. Act. 36.*
9. We must bow at the Name of the Virgin *Mary*, and of the Pope, as well as at the Name of *Jesus.* *Par. Crassus de Ceremoniis Card. & Episc. lib. 1. c. 22.*
10. Whosoever obeyeth not the Command of the Pope, shall die the death. *Ribadeniera, lib. 1. de Principe, c. 17. p. 108.*
11. The Cross hath precedence before the Eagles or Ensigns of the Empire; the Sword of *Peter* before that of *Constantine*; and the Apostolick Seat judgeth, and is above the Imperial power. *Baronius in Paren. p. 9.*
12. That the Pope cannot be judged by any person; for it's written, *That the Spiritual person judgeth all things, but he himself is not judged,* 1 Cor. c. 7.
13. All the Princes of the Earth must do honour and reverence to the Pope as a great God. *Biondus lib. 3. Rom. instaurat.*
14. An appeal can be made from the Council to the Pope. *Johannes de Sylva de Beneficiis, part 4. p. 4. n. 28. T. 15. part 1. fo. 109.*
15. No appeal can be made from the Pope to the Council. *Jacobatus de Concil. ar. 1. n. 36. T. 13. part. 1. fo. 352. 16. 26. fo. 270. 1.*

CHAP. III.

Of the Power of the Pope.

1. **T**HE Pope can do all things that God himself can do, only sin excepted: *Jacob. de Griffis decis. aurea. part. 1. c. 31.*
2. The Pope hath no limits or bounds in the whole World, but those which is self had. *Jacob. Fuligatus vitâ Card. Bellarm. lib. 3. c. 3.*
3. He hath power of making sin more sin; and that which is no sin, to be sin. *Bellar. contra Barclasum, c. 31.*
4. The Pope can give Empires and Kingdoms to whom he pleaseth, and depole the possessors of them. *Jul. Ferretus de re & discip. militari, p. 516. Celsus Mancinus de juribus Principum, lib. 3. c. 3. p. 76. Greg. de Valentis, To. 3. disp. 1. 4. 12. punct. 2. col. 439. 443.*
5. The Pope may depose Kings by his power, if they be either negligent in the administration of their Government, or do not extirpate all Hereticks out of their Dominions. *Hosien. Sam. lib. 5. tit. de Heretic. 8. que pama. S. 11. Johannes de Tazz. Cremala sum. de eccl'es. c. 14. propof. 44. Panormitanus, lib. 5. Decret. de Heretic. c. 13.*
6. If a King turns Heretick, he hath no right to his Kingdom, and so no man ought to think it strange if the Pope depose him. *Dom. à Soto. in 4. sentent. dist. 25. q. 2. a. 1. n. 3. Alphons. à Castro de justa hereticorum punitione. lib. 2. c. 7. col. 12. 43. 1246.*
7. If Kings will not be obedient to the Church, then may the Pope by his great power from Heaven very justly turn them from all their Royalties and Government; and the Subjects themselves, if the Pope bid them, must take up Arms against them. *Gre. Nunnus Coronet. de vera Christi Eccles. lib. 9. p. 345.*
8. The Pope can quit Subjects from the Obedience and Allegiance which they owe to their Kings. *Joh. Maria Bellettus discq. clerical. part. 1. p. 282. p. 109. Panormitan. in Decret. de Hereticis. c. 13.*
9. If the King doth tyrannize, and doth not execute his Office duly, or when there is any other just cause for so doing, then the people may dethrone him, and elect another. *Em. Sa. Aphorif. 5. principis. 9. 2. Molina de just. tom. 1. Tract. 2. disp. 19. col. 213, 214. Jacob. Simonica de Cathol. Inst. 7. 9. §. 257.*
10. The Pope may make an Ordinance contrary to the Epistle of St. Paul. *Char. Ruinus Conf. 109. n. 1. Vol. 5.*
11. The power of the Pope is greater than that of the Apostles, having power to derogate from the sayings and words of the Apostle. The Decif. of the Rota at Rome. *Decif. 1. n. 3. Antonius Maria in addit. ad decis. novas, n. 9.*
12. The Doctrine of the Pope is the infallible rule of Faith, and the Holy Scripture hath taken its force, and doth take it from his Holiness; and he that doth not believe this is an Heretick. *Silvester Prieras in epitom. resp. ad Luther. c. 7. To. 1.*
13. The Pope is he by whom Kings reign according to that which is said, *By me Kings reign. Fr. Bosius de temporal. Eccles. Monarchia. lib. 1. c. 3. 11.* And therefore Henry the Fourth Emperour, being excommunicated by Pope Gregory the 7th, he puts off his Royal and Imperial Habiliments with his Wife and young Son bare-footed and clotied in Canvas (being made a Spectacle to Angels and Men to admire at) in a most bitter Winter, and most dangerous kind of Travel, cometh to Canasum, where the Pope then resided; Fasting and Suiter like from Morning till Evening he danceth attendance; for three dayes he patiently endureth this lamentable affliction, being often told his Holiness was not at leisure to attend his Suit, and denyed admittance; but after great importunities and solicitations, and giving Oath and security for his good behaviour for the future, he

is absolved. *Naucletius*, p. 36. *Urspergensis*, *Platina in vita Grego.* 7. By this the Power and Supremacy of the Pope is to be seen over Emperours and Kings.

14. The Pope may do, what God doth. *Decret. de Major. et obedient. c. sollicit. 6.*

CHAP. IV.

Religion, Prayer, Faith, Charity.

IT's in the Precept of Prayer, as in that of Faith, Hope, and Charity, there is no certain time wherein this Precept obligeth directly; but only indirectly, to wit, When its necessary to acquire some good, or to remove some evil. He that prayes not to God in a temptation against chastity, sins only against chastity; for he sins not in omitting prayer, but because of the danger he is in to violate chastity. *Tamber. decal. c. 4. sect. 2. n. 5.*

So that we are not at any time obliged directly to pray unto God any more than to love him, believe, or trust in him; but indirectly, and as it were by accident, when we have need, as in a temptation, or the like.

2. In our private prayers which we make to God, it's not necessary to use any attention, nor are we obliged to attend: for this obligation goes no further than to venial sin; and those prayers which are made by command, in that case none is obliged upon pain of mortal sin, to an inward attention in saying his Office, provided he rehearse it outwardly and entirely. *Fillut. Mor. q. q. Tom. 2. tr. 23. c. 8. n. 252.*

3. Whatsoever distraction or evil thoughts there are in the mind of Man in Prayer, and when he rehearses the Divine Office, though it be voluntary, if it comes of negligence and not of contempt, it's but a venial sin: when it comes from a formal and deliberate contempt, yet we fail not in satisfying the Church, and discharging our Duty. *Escobar. tr. 5. exam. 6. n. 157. p. 679.* For it's not necessary to satisfy the command of the Church, to have any inward attention; but it's sufficient to give some outward respect, and behave ones self decently. *Cominck 3. part q 83. art. 68. 247. n. 286. n. 301. p. 286.* The outward act of prayer, which is done with the outward circumstances which it ought to have, is a true exterior action of the virtue of Religion, though it be done with voluntary distraction, which is it self a sin. *Cominck, ibidem.* For the outward adoration which is rendred to an Idol, is a true and outward act of adoration, and of idolatry; though he who makes this adoration outwardly, hath no intention to adore the Idol. *Bauny in his Sum. ch. 13. p. 176.* So we must believe that they pray who recite the Office, though without intention, yet not without exterior decency and composure such as the action requires. *Bauny. ibidem.*

4. Christ commands us to receive Baptism, a Tyrant forbids us to receive it, upon pain of our lives; we are obliged not to receive it. *Escob. lib. 1. Theol. mor. sect. 2. c. 7. problem. 29.*

5. In receiving the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, it's not necessary to have actual devotion; for he who is voluntarily distracted in the receiving the Sacrament, provided he contemns it not, puts no obstacle to the effect of the Communion, because he sins not mortally. *Fillut. Tom. 1. mor. q. q. tr. 4. chap. 6. n. 163, 164. p. 87.*

6. If actual sin be committed in the very Communion it self, it hinders not at all from the receiving the grace of the communion; because this Sin makes not the person unworthy of the participation of the Body and Blood of *Jesus Christ*; for there is nothing but mortal sin that is capable of causing this Unworthiness. *Fillut. ibidem.*

7. He who hath sinned mortally, and hath remorse for his sins, and hath confessed them, may absolutely communicate, though the very night before, or even a little

God Commands one thing, and a Tyrant another; we must obey the Tyrant rather than God.

a little before the Communion, he hath sinned mortally. *Filut. tr. 4. c. 8. n. 224.*

8. If a man after he hath communicated many times in a bad state, cometh to be converted, he shall receive in an instant all the graces which were due to so many Communions, though they were received in an unworthy manner. *Mascarenhas. tr. 1. de Sac. in gen. disp. 4. c. 5. n. 211.* From this admirable doctrine it followeth, That a man may become most holy in an instant, and will surpals in holiness, many of those who have lived in innocency, when he was plunged in Sin; and the greater and more sins he hath committed, the more holy he is.

9. It's not necessary that the Priest who finds himself guilty of mortal sin, should confess himself before he administers the Sacrament. *Disfast. tr. 2. de Sac. d. 3. d. 10. n. 200.*

10. The Priest may administer the Sacrament to one who sinneth publicly, provided that he doth not receive it publicly through contempt of the Sacrament or of Religion, but for some other end; and that he threaten the Priest with death or loss of reputation, or to do some great wrong to him in his goods; and this is rather to permit sin in another for some just cause, than to co-operate therewith. *Escob. lib. 4. Theol. Mor. c. 3.*

11. In extream necessity we are obliged to do alms of such things as are not necessary unto life, though they be needful to support us in our condition. *Escob. tr. 5. Exam. 5. n. 43. p. 632.* By *Extream Necessity*, we must understand that on which the life of man depends; so that if he be not assisted, he will surely dye: in this case we are obliged to give that which is superfluous.

12. A person who hath abundance, after he hath satisfied all his own necessities, and those of his own family, having yet a superfluity, is not obliged in a public Famine to give unto the Poor, nor to any one whomsoever, if he see him not in eminent danger to die with famine. *Escob. tr. 5. exam. 5. n. 47. p. 633.*

13. We are not obliged to assist or give alms unto the poor with any notable diminution of our wealth, honour or life. *Tolet. lib. 4. Inst. Sacerd. c. 10. n. 5. p. 635.*

14. We may fulfill the Precept of Alms, by lending only, without giving any thing. *Tolet. lib. 8. c. 85. n. 2. p. 1242.* And that unless in extream necessity, (in evident danger of death) Alms are not commanded under mortal sin. *Ibid.* And in that case we are not obliged any further to provide for them, if we have not Wealth to spare, and Riches which are superfluous; which very few persons believe they have, because Covetousness and Ambition make all men in a manner necessitous: so that it's clear by the doctrine of these Doctors, the Rich are not obliged to give Alms, but out of their superfluity; and not then, but in case of great necessity. Those things which may exalt us unto a better condition, as Honour, Preferment or Places, are not to be accounted superfluous. *Granad. 22. controver. 4. d. 2. lib. 4. n. 18.* So that rarely it happens that we can have superfluous goods; and so by consequence we must rarely give alms. *Tamb. lib. 5. deat. c. 1. sect. 1. n. 14.*

15. Amongst Christians there are few who are damned for failing to exercise the works of corporal mercy, none being obliged thereunto under mortal sin, unless in the utmost and greatest necessity of his Neighbour, which happens very rarely, so as to impose any great obligation on any particular person. *Less. lib. 13. de perfect. divin. v. 22. n. 142.* And though we are not to give Alms, but in the greatest necessity, yet when that happens, no person is particularly obliged to provide against it; because the obligation is to assist our Neighbour in general to all those who have means to do it, but none in particular; so that a poor man may die of hunger in the view of many persons who may and ought to assist him, while they expect and attend one another, none being bound in particular to satisfy an obligation which is in common to them all.

18. It's

Vide contr.
Joh. 13. 34.
Jo. c. 15. v.
12, 17. Mar.
c. 22. v. 40.

16. It's certain, there is no obligation to love our Neighbour by any intern act of the Will, expressly terminated in him; whence it is, if you hate him not, and for his sake observe the outward works of good will, you love him sufficiently. *Suarez. c. 5. d. 1. lib. 4. n. 4. Filut. Tom. 2. mor. q. q. tr. 22. c. 9. n. 283. p. 92.* Of 32 Parables, which is the most frequent manner of Christ's discourse, he applies but one for the recommendation of the love of our Neighbour, in the person of the distressed poor man abused by Thieves betwixt *Jericho* and *Jerusalem*. *Sermond. tr. 2. p. 121.*

It's no mortal sin to have such a hatred against our Neighbour, as not to be willing to keep company with him; to have such and so violent an aversion from him, as upon no terms or occasion to be willing to speak with him, nor help him in his business, nor at all to forgive him, when he acknowledgeth his fault, and offers satisfaction. *Bauny's Sum. p. 81.*

17. There is no absolute Commandment to love God; because every Command carries some threatening with it to keep them in their duty to whom it is made, and then some penalty or punishment against those who violate it; now the Commandment which God gave us to love him, contains neither threat nor punishment; and so by consequence it's no Commandment truly so called. *Sermond in his Defence of Virtue, Tr. 2. p. 28.* God commanding us to love him, contents himself that we should obey him in his other Commandments: for God hath not obliged us absolutely to testify our affections to him, otherwise than by yielding obedience to him. *Ibid. p. 11.* And God hath not commanded us so much to love, as not to hate him. *Ibid. p. 19.* And all those which in Scripture are vulgarly called Commands to love God, they are Advices and Counsels, but not Commands. *Ibidem, p. 20, 21.* God ought to be content that we love him a little as we please, because to love him more, and to a certain degree, is only an Advice; it sufficeth that we love him much under what we could, if we would; because the least degree of love, is enough for him, and to satisfy the Commandment. *Amic. Tom. 4. d. 23. sect. 2. n. 21, 22, 19.*

Whereas it's said we must love God above all things; we must not extend these words (*All things*) to the rigour in its utmost extent; and according to its natural sense, so as it comprehend under it all Creatures, but that we must understand (by *all things*) only those which are evil, contrary to God, and which destroy the friendship we have with him by Grace; (that is to say) mortal sin only. *Amic. Tom. 4. disp. 29. sect. 2. n. 16.*

And if we be obliged to love God, we are not obliged to love him above three or four moments in our life, whereof the first is when we begin to have the use of Reason; Secondly, at the point of death. Thirdly, every fifth year during life. *Filut. Tom. 2. mor. q. q. tr. 22. c. 9. n. 286, 290. p. 93.* The rest of our time we may love God or the World as we please.

18. If a man hath committed any mortal sin, he is not obliged to contrition and sorrow for the sin before the article of his death. *Filut. Tom. 1. q. q. mor. tr. 6. c. 8. n. 198, 199, 157.* So that (according to this doctrine) who is in mortal sin, may with a safe Conscience persist voluntarily all his life in a state of enmity and aversion to God, and delay his Conversion until the point of death, demanding only forgiveness of God, when he is ready to die and can offend him no longer.

19. If a man being at the point of death, endeavours to do what he can, and having in his mind only an act of attrition present, he saith unto God these words, *Lord have mercy on me*, with design to pacify him, he shall be justified, God himself supplying the want of absolution. *Esfob. tr. 7. Exam. 4. n. 122. p. 819.*

20. Faith and Charity are not such supernatural Graces and Vertues as the World takes them to be; for a man may be a Martyr and merit the Crown of Martyrdom, not only without any act of Charity, but also without any act of Faith;

Faith ; and though he suffers without love to God, and though he never thinks of him, it's sufficient that he be killed out of hatred to the Faith, though he have not so much as a thought of confessing it ; as it happens in a suddain eruption of *Barbarians*, one is killed in his sleep through hatred of Faith, *Connick 3. par. q. 66. de baptisf. a. 12. n. 136. p. 8. Celor. lib. 3. c. 3. p. 125.*

21. It matters not, if death had been propoied to this man, the fear it would have brought on him, would possibly have forced him to forget God ; yet because this conditional supposition produces no real thing in the man, it cannot hurt him. *Connick 3. par. q. 66. de baptisf. p. 139.* So then to be a Martyr, it's not at all necessary to have so much as a conditional will to die for God, if occasions were presented, that the contrary disposition, rather to forsake God than lose his life on this occasion, cannot hurt him, and by consequence it's not bad, nor hinders a man from being in a state to receive a Crown of Martyrdom, if he die without ever thinking of it in this disposition by the hand of a Tyrant.

22. He who outwardly recites the Office of the Church, doth perform the duty of Prayer, though he doth it without any inward intention or devotion, so as the outward appearance and Precept be observed, which such an action requires, for the outward action wherewith we attend on God, is of the same nature, and appertains to the virtue of Religion. *Bauny in his sum. c. 20. p. 335.* And the duty of prayer is satisfied though there be no intention. *Esfob. tr. 5. exam. 6. c. 13. n. 136. p. 677.* For he that doth in substance, that is to say, outwardly, that which is commanded, satisfies truly the Commandment of the Church, though he hath no will to accomplish it, but rather the contrary. *Layman. lib. 1. tr. 4. c. 4. n. 6. p. 49.*

23. The Blessed Virgin is more easie intreated than Jesus Christ, therefore her protection is more assisting and helpful to us. *Fr. de Mendoza virid. lib. 2. probl. 2.*

24. There is as great efficacy, as to Salvation, in the Virgin Mary's Milk, as in our Saviour's Blood. *Andr. Rivet. Apol. lib. 2. c. 5. p. 248. Idem, lib. 1. c. 19. p. 155. Idem, Jesuita vulg. c. 14, 15. p. 3307, 808.*

25. A man may be saved without ever loving God in all his life. *Let. Provinc. 11. p. 160.*

26. It's lawful to consult a Conjurer. *Addit. myster. Jesuit. p. 111.* And that an expert Conjurer in diabolical arts is well worthy a reward. *Let. Provinci. p. 116.* And a Fortune-teller is not obliged to restitution, if he hath consulted the Devil. *Addit. p. 20. s. 19.*

CHAP. V.

Of Sin.

1. **H**E that from the impressiion of an inveterate custom, as it were, dy a sort of impetuous necessity, is transported to do evil, as to speak words of Blasphemy, sins not at all ; because a man cannot sin without rational knowledg and deliberation. *Layman, lib. 1. tr. 2. c. 3. n. 6. p. 20.* An evil custom takes away the use of reason, and so by consequence it doth not augment but diminish sin ; nay, sometimes it takes it away ; so that man who hath these evil habits, is in a better condition than he that hath them not : and by often sinning, is put into a condition or state of not sinning any more.

2. Perjury, which one commits through natural inadvertency, or because of the custom he hath to swear, is no mortal sin, though he who doth it, hath his will effectually addicted to sin by an evil habit. *Filut. Mor. Tom. 2 tr. 25. c. 1. n. 27. p. 173.* By this admirable doctrine, although a man perjure himself, he having not a full knowledg, or transported with some violent habit, it's no mortal sin in him.

3. If a man customarily curse his Horse, Dogs, Hawks, or other Creatures, which are without reason, setting aside choler by which he suffers himself to be transported, it's no sin at all, because this evil custom is become natural, and makes him do it without any passion, and even so as he perceives it not, therefore he commits no sin, in the most strange curses and execrations. *Banny's sum. c. 6. p. 73. c. 5. p. 66.*

4. Those who in their Youth, have committed many actions of a vitious nature, which they did not believe to be such, are not obliged to confess one word of them, when they know and understand their nature. *Banny in his sum. c. 40. p. 650, 651.* Because when they were committed, they had not the full use of reason, and knowledg, and at most they were but venial sins, if any sin at all.

5. If any one shoots an Arrow by which he hits his enemy, supposing invincibly that it was a Beast, he is altogether innocent of this man's slaughter, though he was in such a disposition, that if he had known that it had been his Enemy, he would have killed him with more joy. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 16. n. 13. p. 70.*

6. The pleasure which is taken in an action of mortal sin, which is done in sleep, drunkenness, madness or through ignorance, is no sin. *Filut. Mor. Tom. 2: tr. 21. c. 8. n. 290. p. 16.* Ignorance is a great *Asylum* for innocency, for it doth not only protect men from the greatest sins, but it giveth them liberty and power to rejoyce and take pleasure in them as good actions, when one comes to know them or call them to remembrance.

7. He who knows that it is a mortal sin to commit an action, but knows not that it is a sin to command another to commit it, through invincible ignorance, is excused from sin in doing it. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 16. n. 19.* Therefore if a Peasant should hear it spoken by a man reputed to be Pious and Knowing, that it was a sin to steal, and commit fornication outwardly, but that it was lawful to desire the one or the other, in this case the interior act is exempt from all sin, because of invincible ignorance. *Ibidem.*

8. To sin mortally, it's not enough to see the evil that is done, and the danger incurred in doing, but he ought to have a full and perfect knowledg, and besides this, both time and means to deliberate on it; therefore such actions which are committed out of ignorance, evil habits, or passion, are not mortal sins; it's not enough to commit a mortal sin, to consider and to will with deliberation the evil that is done, but this consideration and deliberation must be full. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 16. n. 21.* Therefore when there occur in one and the same action two sorts of different wickedness, it's not sufficient to perceive one, to make him guilty of both, but we must have or be obliged to have an actual knowledg of the other; Therefore when a man lyes with a woman whom he knowes to be not his Wife, but is invincibly ignorant that she is his Kinswoman, he is guilty of Fornication, but not of Incest. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 1. n. 8. p. 270. Amie. Tom. 3. d. 17. f. 8. n. 172. p. 205. Eschob. tr. 2. Exam. 1. c. 3. n. 8. p. 275.*

9. He who doth some unlawful act, knowing well that it's forbidden, but not remembering it to be such when he doth it, is exempt from mortal sin; because forgetfulness or negligence which is the cause we think not of it, the evil we are about to do, is not imputed for sin, if it be not voluntary: and it's not voluntary, if we bethink us not to consider that we are obliged to examin what we are about to do. *Layman. lib. 1. tr. 12. c. 4. n. 6. p. 20.*

10. To sin, it's not sufficient to do the evil that is forbidden, or not to do that which is commanded by the Law of God, Nature or the Church; but it's necessary to have a knowledg of the evil that we do, and an intention to do it: By this rule we are free from the greatest sins, so we have a good intention in committing of them, or that we have no evil intention: we may wish evil or death to our Neighbour, without sin, when we are induced thereunto by some good

good motive, as that he is given to suing; or that he is a person of good reputation for his well living, and therefore doth eclipse our credit. *Baunty's sum. c. 6. p. 73.*

11. He who doth maintain an Heretical Proposition without believing it, or who shall be a Communicant or Auditor amongst Protestants without having his Heart there, but out of pure derision, or to comply with the Times, and to accomplish his designs, he ought not to be esteemed a Protestant therefore; because his understanding is not infected with their errors. *Bonatina. d. 3. q. 4. n. 7.*

12. He who hath knowledge of the Law, and is ignorant of the penalty which it ordains against those who violate it, doth not incur the penalty which he is to undergo if he obey not. *Tambur. Decal. lib. 1. c. 2. sect. 16. n. 12.*

13. God cannot command or forbid a matter that is in it self slight under the penalty of mortal sin. *Em. Sa. verb. Præcept. n. 1. p. 575. Amic. Tom. 5. a. 5. de lege humana. f. 8. n. 194. p. 64.*

14. He that hath a will to commit all venial sins if he were able, sins only venially. *Escobar. tr. 2. exam. 1. c. 12. n. 57. p. 385.*

15. To make an action evil and unlawful, is required first to make it appear, that the reasons which prove the malice of the action be demonstrative; that is, that they be such as whereunto no probable answer can be given. Secondly, that the reasons which prove this same action to be good and lawful, be not so much as probable. Thirdly, that the Opinions which maintain that this action is good, hath not sufficient authority to be held probable; all these must be observed, otherwise the action is not evil. *Caram. fund. p. 138.*

16. To tell a lye in Preaching on any doctrinal Point, is but a venial sin. *Escobar. tr. 7. exam. 4. n. 107. p. 816.*

17. To perform the most sacred actions, as to administer the Sacraments, or to receive them, or to celebrate the Mass for vain-glory, is but a venial sin, though vain-glory be proposed as the principal end. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9.*

18. When a slight thing is commanded, the commandment obliges not unto mortal sin, although that be the intention of him who commands. *Em. Sa. verb. præcept. n. 1. p. 575.*

19. The greatness of the sin ought to be estimated from, and according to its matter and subject. *Escobar. Sanch.*

20. No person is obliged to avoid the next occasion of sin, when thereby some great loss will befall him; in this case it cannot be said that he wills this occasion, but permits it only; because that he withdraws not from this occasion, is not that he would absolutely abide in it, but because he would decline the damage which this withdrawing would bring on him. *Sanch. in select. disp. 10. n. 10.*

For this reason a man is not obliged to put away his Concubine, if her company be very advantageous to him, and in departing with her he lose any great benefit.

21. A thing is not the next occasion of sin, unless it be vitious and a sin of it self. *Baunty's Theol. mor. par. 1. lib. 4. de pænit. q. 14. p. 94.*

22. To sell a Woman paint, which he knows he will use to draw young men to unchast love, it's lawful; otherwise he would lose a Customer, and suffer loss and damage: So to build the Temple of an Idol, or to sell an Idol it self, or to sell an Infidel a Lamb, which he knew he would use in Sacrifice to an Idol, is no sin. *Tamb. lib. 5. decal. c. 1. f. 4. n. 38, 34, 35, 36.*

23. All the breaches of the first and second Table of the Decalogue are no sins at all, when they are committed by any out of ignorance, surprise or passion. *Myst. of Jesuit. add. p. 125. London. 1658.*

24. It's no sin to contract a Marriage by personation, as if it were in a Play upon

By this maxim, he that doth not know that Hell is the punishment of mortal Sin, shall not be in danger of going thither.

upon the Stage, by using equivocal expressions in the Church, when one is forced thereunto by great fear. *Add. Myth. of Jesuitism, p. 45. s. 24.*

So that you may learn how comfortable and holy these Sacred Doctrines of the Jesuits are, and how far their Gospel doth exceed that of Jesus Christ; for he hath made the way to Heaven so narrow, and the Gate so streight, that few can enter in; whereas by the indulgence of these holy Fathers the way to Heaven is made so broad, that the people may safely go thither without jostling one another, and may with less pains go to Heaven than to Hell; and indeed let men do what they will, they cannot (according to their pious doctrines) go to Hell, for none go thither but for mortal sins; and how difficult a thing it is to sin mortally, you may observe by what hath been delivered unto you; and in case they go to Hell, these great and learned Doctors have a holy knack, and mysterious exorcism to fetch them out.

CHAP. VI.

Of Directing the Intention of good and bad Intentions:

TO do evil, there must be an evil intention; but to do good, it's not necessary to have a good intention. The Commands of God and the Church may be satisfied by an outward execution of what they ordain, though it be done without intention to fulfil them, or with an evil intent; and contrary to the Commandment, and even with an express intention not to fulfil it, and on the contrary, to render a man guilty of having violated the Commands of God, and the Church, it's not sufficient to violate them; but it's required to have therein a formed design and express intention.

2. Ecclesiasticks satisfy the Precept of the Church in saying Prayers, when they sing or read them; though they do it without any inward intention or devotion; provided they observe outward modesty and decency: nay the Precept is satisfied, though the intention be express and formal not to satisfy it. *Baunty's sum. ch. 20. p. 335. Escob. tr. 5. exam. 6. c. 13. n. 136. p. 677.* So that the outward appearance is more necessary to Prayer, and to the actions of Religion, than the inward motions of Piety; because they can subsist without this inward motion, but not without external shew: and we may perform the duty of Prayer, though we have a formal design not to obey the Church, and to despise its Commandment.

3. If a man fast for vain-glory, or to content his sensuality in eating and drinking Wine; and so act contrary to the intent of the Church, yet he doth not violate her Commands; for he that doth in substance, that is to say, outwardly, that which is commanded, satisfies truly the Commandment, though he hath no will to accomplish it, but rather contrary. *Laym. lib. 1. tr. 4. c. 4. n. 6. p. 49.*

4. If a man hears a Sermon, or be present at the Divine Office of the Church, with a bad intent thereunto joyned, as an intent of looking on a Woman dishonestly, is not contrary to the commandments of the Church, neither doth he therein sin; but fulfil the Precept of hearing Prayers. *Fillut. mor. qq. Tem. 2. tr. 5. c. 7. n. 2, 12. p. 128.*

5. If a man speak never so dishonourably and irreverently of God, it's no Blasphemy, if he had not a formal intent to blaspheme God and dishonour him. *Baunty's sum. c. 5. p. 66. Bonacina. d. 3. q. 8. p. 2. n. 2.*

6. No man is responsible for the evil effects which are adherent to any action, except he formerly intend and procure them; therefore though a Woman knows that a man loves her dishonestly, she sins not, how often soever she presents her self before him; and in his view, so as she hath not an intent to stir up the dishonest love which he hath towards her. *Fillut. To. 2. tr. 28. c. 10. n. 232.* because he that loves her dishonestly, doth rather take this occasion of offence from

from his own malice, then she gives it him by the use of her own right and liberty.

6. If a man be to do an act, and makes protestation that his intention is not to do any evil; let the act be never so wicked, it's no sin in him. *Bauny's sum. c. 14. p. 219.* Therefore to kill an Heretick, if your intention be to propagate the Roman Catholique faith, it's no sin; and an Usurer who giveth his Money, so interest to make profit thereof, may deliver himself from Usury and Restitution, with protestation that it's not in his intention to make any usurious contract, but to lend it him for his good, and that he would do nothing therein against God and his Conscience. *Bauny. ibidem.*

7. A Mother which desires the death of her Daughters for want of Beauty or Portions, because she cannot make them according to her desire, or because perhaps by occasion of them, she is ill treated by her Husband; this good intention of the Mother is sufficient to excuse the Mother from all sin, who desires the death of the daughters. *Bonafina. d. 3. q. 4. n. 7.*

8. If a Servant by the command of his Master goes and tells a Woman with whom he knowes his Master intends to commit Adultery, that his Master will be found at home such an hour; or if by the command of his Master he follows a Damosel to see and enquire where she lodges, if by his command he doth not only open the door, but shew her where his Master is, if he aid his Master to get up by the Window to enter the house where he is to commit the sin, the Servant by directing his intention, may free himself of any such or the like sin, by intending that he did it for some good end, as for the just reward which he expected, or for fear of the loss of his Master's favour, or some other damage: and protesting that he is not pleased with this sin of his Master. *Tamb. lib. 5. de cal. c. 1. sect. 4. n. 30.*

9. You may desire the death of an Enemy who might do you much hurt, not of hatred to him, but to avoid the damage and hurt which he would do you; you may also rejoyce in his death, because of the good which you receive thereby. *Em. Sa. verb. charitat. n. 8. p. 65.* And all this may be done without sin, by that excellent Science of directing the Intention.

10. To lye with a Woman (by the rule of directing the Intention) whom he representeth to himself as under a condition, and as if he were married to her, is a thing which is not ill, and which on the contrary is good. *Sanct. op. mer. lib. 1. c. 2. n. 34. p. 9. Fillut. mor. Tam. 2. tr. 21. c. 8. n. 269. p. 27.*

11. It's lawful for persons of all qualities, conditions and sexes, to go to the the Stewes or places of common prostitution, (intending to convert Women) though it be very probable (as frequently before) they will there commit sins themselves. *Myst. of Jesuitism. p. 146, 147.*

12. If any man hath done me an injury or wrong, I may pursue him, not with an intention to be revenged of him, or to render evil for evil, but out of an intention to preserve my honour. *Reginaldus in praxi. lib. 21. n. 62. p. 260.* There is no more to be done, than to divert the Intention from the desire of Revenge, which is sinful, to incline it to a desire of maintaining our honour, which is allowable; and by this means you may acquit your self of all obligation both towards God, and towards Man, for you satisfy the World by permitting the action, and satisfy the Gospel by purifying the intention.

13. A man may accept of a Challenge and fight a Duel in maintenance of his honour; and come to the place appointed, not with an express intention to fight the Duel, but only with that of defending himself, if he, by whom he was challenged, comes unjustly to set upon him; for what hurt can there be for a man to go into the Field to walk there, in expectation of another, and to defend himself if any one sets upon him? it's no sin at all; for when the intention is directed to other circumstances, the Challenge is not at all accepted, for the ac-
ception

ception of a Challenge consists in the express intention of fighting, which such a man hath not. *Provincial Letter. 7.*

14. In the Indies in China, they allow their profelyte Christians to commit Idolatry by this craft, viz. that of enjoining them, to hide under their cloaths an Image of Jesus Christ, to which they teach them by a mental reservation to direct those publick adorations, which they render the Idol. *Cachins. Choan. Succum. Myster. of Jesuit. lib. 5. p. 53, 54.*

CHAP. VII.

Of Adultery, Fornication.

1. Virgins have power to dispose of their Virginity without the consent of Parents; for when that is done with the consent of the Maid, though the Father hath just cause to be troubled at it, yet neither she, nor the person to whom she hath prostituted her self, hath done him any injury, nor as to what concerns him, violated any Law; for the Maid is in possession of her Virginity as well as of her body, she may dispose of it, as she pleareth, and to whom she pleareth, death or mutilation of member only excepted. *Baunys's Sum. p. 148.*

2. It's no sin to let a House to a Whore, though he knows she will abuse his House to sin; because he let his House to lodg in, and not to prostitute her self therein. *Molina de Inst. & Jur. To. 2. tr. 2. disp. 500. p. 1122. Græ. Valentia. Tom. 3. d. 5. q. 21. Escob. tr. 3. Exam. 9. c. 4. n. 28. 8, 9. p. 155.*

3. To lye with a married Woman is not Adultery, if the Husband doth consent thereunto. *Addit. to the Myst. of Jesuit. p. 110. 5. 3.*

4. If a Woman presents her self to the view of a man whom she knows to love her dishonestly, doth not commit any mortal sin, because she is not obliged to deprive her self of the liberty of standing at a Dore or a Window, or to walk forth into the Town. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 6. n. 16. p. 19.*

5. To lye with a Woman considered as ones Wife, is no sin; for the pleasure that the Will takes in a thing which is represented to it as good, is no mortal sin. *Escob. tr. 3. Exam. 9. c. 4. n. 28.* Therefore the Will may without mortal sin, not only desire this action, considered in this manner, but may regard it simply with pleasure. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 2. n. 34. p. 9. Filut. mor. Tom. 2. tr. 21. c. 8. n. 269. p. 27.*

6. An Ecclesiastick is not faulty who procures an abortion, if he doubts whether the fruit of the Womb were quick. *Myst. Jesuitif. addit. p. 93. 5. 13.*

7. That which one receiveth for being a Pander to a debauched person, or for committing of Fornication, he is not bound to any restitution, but may conscionably be detained, if the fact be already done. *Filut. mor. 22. Tom. 2. tr. 32. c. 4. n. 103. p. 364.*

8. If a drunken or mad-man lyeth with a Woman, it is no mortal sin, because there was no use of reason, and the action without liberty, and therefore indifferent as the coupling of Beasts. *Filut. mor. tr. 21. c. 5. n. 290. p. 34.*

9. If a Peasant hath heard it said by a man that is in reputation for a knowing or honest man, That Fornication is sin, but the desire of it is lawful; this interior act of Concupiscence is exempt from sin, because the opinion was probable. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 16. p. 71.*

10. There may be a dispensation granted for Fornication, because it's not evident that it's forbidden by the Law of Nature; and it's probable that it is only by the positive Law. *Tamb. lib. 7. decal. c. 1. f. 2. n. 1.* And so it may be made lawful when Authority shall think it convenient to take away the prohibition, which alone renders it evil and criminal.

11. A man may be invincibly ignorant that Fornication is a sin; and in that case if he doth commit Fornication, it's no sin, because invincible ignorance excuseth

cureth from sin, therefore a man in state of ignorance may commit Fornication without sin. *Fillut. mor. Tom. 2. tr. 30. c. 2. n. 50. p. 389. Azor. Tom. 1. lib. 1. c. 13. p. 34.*

12. Masters and Maid-Servants, and Cousins of both Sexes living together, and mutually induced by that means unto sin, if their relapses be but once or twice a moneth, they may continue therein, when they cannot avoid them without finding the World matter of discourse, or running into some inconvenience thereby. *Myft. of Jesuit. p. 146.*

13. If the Concubine be very useful to the Fornicator to cherish him, and to keep him in good humour, so that without her he lives in Melancholy, and hath great distast of the food which is prepared for him, he cannot be obliged in this case to put away his Concubine, because his satisfaction in these circumstances are more worth than any temporal good. *Sanctius in select. disp. 10. n. 20.*

14. If you be desired by your Friend to carry a Present to be given on the account of dishonest love, unto a Concubine, to whom he sends it, you may carry it without sin, if you have a just cause of fearing a considerable loss. *Tamb. lib. decal. c. 1. f. 4. n. 30. as the loss of your Friend.*

15. Absolution may be given a Woman who entertains at her house a man with whom she offends frequently, if she cannot handsomely send him away. *Bauny's Theol. mor. p. 1. tr. 4. de penit. q. 14. p. 94.*

16. It's lawful for a married woman to retain to her self the price of her Adultery, and the reason is excellent, because the Husband is not so Master of the body of his Wife, that he hath a perfect dominion over it, but he hath only the power to use it according to the Law of Marriage, which certainly takes not from the Woman power to gain something by prostituting her Body. *Tamb. lib. 1. decal. c. 2. f. 6. n. 12.*

17. If a Concubine dyes or withdraws her self, it's lawful for the Man to take another Maid-Servant, what fear soever he hath of falling into sin with her, if he cannot find some other who is capable to assist him in his affairs and conveniences; for if this reason dispense with him for not putting her away whom he hath already taken, it will give him a right to take her whom he hath not as yet. *Sanct. select. disp. 10. n. 20.*

18. By the Bull *Cruciata*, a man may be dispensed with the vow he hath made not to commit Fornication or any other sin. *Addit. to the Myserie of Jesuitism. p. 95. s. 25.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of Murder.

1. IT's lawful for an honourable person to kill an assailant who would strike him with a Cudgel, or give him a box on the ear to affront him, if he cannot otherwise avoid the disgrace. *Lessius de Justitia & Jure, lib. 2. c. 9. dub. 8. n. 41. p. 83.* otherwise the reputation of the innocent person would be perpetually exposed to the affronts of the insolent. *Azor. Inst. mor. par. 3. p. 105. Hurtado de Mendoza 22. disp. 170. f. 16. s. 137.*

2. If a man endeavour to deprive me of my honour before a Prince, Judge or person of great quality, by accusing me of some feigned crimes, and I have no other way to divert this loss of reputation, it's lawful for me to kill him secretly. *Less. lib. 2. c. 9. dub. 12. n. 77. p. 81.* And the same may be done against him, though the crime be true, so it be hid and secret. *Bannes. q. 64. a. 7. dub. 4.* And *Molina* gives the reason, because it's lawful to imploy all sorts of means, and to make use of all sorts of ways, and of all sorts of Arms, to do that which is necessary for self-defence. *Molina de Just. & Jure. Tom. 4. tr. 3. disp. 2. n. 5. p. 175.*

3. To defend our selves from an affront which would be given us, it's lawful

to prevent the aggressor by killing him, in the same manner as when a man endeavours to deprive us unjustly of life or member, it's lawful to kill him before he execute his design. *Amicus, Tom. 5. de Just. & Jure, disp. 36. s. 7. n. 106. p. 542, 410. 407.*

4. If any person doth unjustly detain your goods from you, you may kill him when you cannot without great trouble and difficulty recover them by the way of Justice. *Less. de just. & Jure, lib. 2. c. 9. dub. 11. n. 70. Dicast. lib. 2. tr. 1. disp. 10. dub. 5. n. 46.* This is an excellent invention to cut off all Suits, there is no need of Judges or Counsellors, but any may do themselves Justice; and instead of sending a Serjeant to arrest the party who detains the goods, he may send one to take away his life.

5. If any person shall take from you an Apple, or any thing to the value of five shillings; and will not restore it, if it will be a shame to you not to take it out of the Thief's hand, you may endeavour to take it from him, and even kill him if it be necessary. *Less. de Just. & Jure, lib. 2. c. 4. c. 9. d. 11. n. 68. p. 88.*

6. If a man hath committed a crime which is not publicly known, and he understands that another hath a design to inform against him, before a Magistrate, if he fears lest his Accuser should cause him to be condemned to lose his life, or goods, he may lawfully kill him. *Molina de Just. & Jure, Tom. 4. tr. 3. n. 39. p. 121. Dicast. lib. 2. tr. 2. disp. 12. par. dub. 2. n. 410.*

7. It's no Murder to kill excommunicated persons. *Grat. caus. 23. q. 5. r. omnium & exam. fo. 460. Edit. Paris. 1531.*

8. It's lawful to kill all those who do us wrong, and all other persons who offend us, though we be assured that they shall be damned by dying in that state. *Escol. tr. 1. exam. 7. c. 2. p. 1154. s. 1. n. 21.* And this right doth not only appertain to one private man, against another private man, but to a publick person; to a Subject against his Prince or Superior; to a Son against his Father, or the Father against the Son. *Amicus de Just. & Jure, disp. 36. s. 5. n. 76. p. 407.*

9. If any person shall endeavour to take away from you your Estate unjustly by foul practices and vexatious Suits at Law; it's lawful to accept or give a Challenge; nay, a man may dispatch his enemy at unawares; nay in such occurrences a man need not confine himself to the ordinary ways of Duels, if he can secretly murder his adversary, and thereby put an end to the business; for by that means he shall not only avoid the hazard he may be in, by exposing his life in fighting, but also not participate of the sin which his enemy would commit by the Duel. *Sanct. Theol. mor. lib. 2. c. 39. n. 7. Provinc. Letter, 7. fo. 90.* So if persons shall conspire to ruin you; or shall unjustly hinder your Creditors from paying you what they owe unto you, it's lawful for you to kill them. *Less. de Just. & Jure, lib. 2. c. 11. n. 67. p. 88.*

10. A man may lawfully kill (by ambush and behind his back) an Informer that prosecutes us in any Court, provided there be a right direction of the Intention; he may lawfully kill the false witness which such a prosecutor produce against him; and the Judge also, if there be any correspondence between him and the witness. *Molina, Tom. 4. tr. 3. disp. 12. Reginaldus, lib. 21. c. 5. n. 57. Tannerus, tr. 3. disp. 4. q. 8. n. 83. Provinc. Letter, 7. fo. 90.*

11. A Priest is obliged to kill a Detractor. *Myst. of Jesuit. p. 94. 97.*

12. If a man hath made use of a woman, he may kill her if she offer to discover what passed between them. *Myst. of Jesuitism, p. 18. s. 6. Caramuell. fund. 5. 7. p. 591.*

13. When he who is assaulted be a person whose life is of importance, and necessary to the weal publick and others, whether it be in Temporals or Spirituals, he is obliged under mortal sin to kill if he can the aggressor in defence of his life. *Molina de Just. Commutat. tr. 3. d. 14. p. 1754.* because he cannot give away the right of those who belong unto him, to whom his life is necessary, being

ing obliged to maintain and defend them ; therefore he sins mortally in not killing the aggressor if he can, for the preservation of his life.

14. He commits not the sin of Manſlaughter, who kills him who invades him unjuſtly, though he gave him an occaſion to aſſault him. *Amicus de Juſt. & Jure, diſp. 36. dub. 5. n. 25. p. 538.* And when it's lawful to kill an invader, it's lawful to deſire his death, as a means neceſſary for our defence. *Dicaſt. lib. 2. tr. 1. diſp. 10. dub. 4. n. 4.*

15. It's lawful to kill him who ſays to you, *Ton lie. Bandellus, lib. 3. diſp. 24. n. 24. Provincial Letter. 7. fo. 93.*

16. An Adulterer may lawfully kill the Husband of a Woman with whom he hath committed adultery, if her Husband, having ſurprized him in the fact, doth aſſault him. *Molina de Juſt. & Jure, Tom. 4. diſp. 14. p. 1765. Tamb. lib. 16. decal. c. 1. ſect. 1. n. 7.* This is an excellent way for an Adulterer to expiate his crime, by making away the Husband's life, after he hath taken away the Wiſes honour.

17. A Thief being entred into a Houſe to ſteal, may in conſequence kill him who would kill him for his Theft, if he cannot eſcape death. *Molina de Juſtitia & Jure, Tom. 4. p. 1766. n. 2.*

18. If a Thief fly away on Horſeback, he may be purſued with a Weapon, or killed with a Piſtol-shot, when after he hath been threatned to be killed, he ceaſe not to bear away what he hath taken ; and though he be not threatned nor admoniſhed thereof, becauſe time permit not, and there is danger never to recover what he carries away. *Dicaſt. lib. 2. tr. 1. diſp. 10. dub. 5. n. 46.*

19. It's not againſt charity to kill a Thief who robs me of things which I cannot recover at Law without much trouble. *Dicaſt. ibidem.*

20. If an honourable perſon be aſſaulted, and in danger to loſe his reputation, if he fly, though by flying he might preſerve his own life, and his who aſſaults him, he is not for all that obliged to fly ; but it's lawful to kill him, who invades him unjuſtly in defence of his life and honour. *Mol. Tom. 4. p. 1778.* For when a man hath only his honour to defend, he is not obliged to fly, becauſe he is to ſet more by his honour, than money or goods ; therefore there is no reaſon to oblige Chriſtians to loſe poſſeſſion of ſo pretious a thing as Honour ; by flying from him who aſſaults them ſo unjuſtly.

21. It's lawful to kill a ſlanderer or falſe witneſs ſecretly in an affair, wherein not only life, but even outward goods alſo of great importance are in queſtion. *Amic. Tom. 5. de Juſt. & Jure, diſp. 36. ſect. 4. n. 76. p. 537.*

22. If any one aſſault you, and makes uſe of an innocent perſon to ſhelter him, you may kill him, that you may hit him who invades you. *Eſcob. tr. 1. exam. 7. n. 52. p. 121.* If a man fly from his enemy and cannot eſcape but through ſome ſtrait way, wherein he will cruſh to death ſome Infant or lame perſon, he may kill or ride over him, though he be aſſured that he will die thereof ; becauſe every man hath right to defend himſelf, and his meeting with or interpoſure of an innocent perſon doth not take away his right. *Leſſ. de Juſt. lib. 2. c. 9. dub. 9. n. 57. p. 86.*

You may obſerve how highly this new Theologie of the Jeſuits hath obliged the World, in granting this liberty to defend mens lives, honours and goods againſt any aggreſſor, which the Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt hath denyed unto them. By this Indulgence people are kept in obedience from invading the rights of others, and peace eſtabliſhed amongſt them, for fear of offending ; when the perſon offended, is both Judge, Party, and Executioner ; by their divinity you may kill an Enemy, a Slanderer, a Thief, an Informer in falſe crimes, and even in true ones, but ſecret, and which is yet more, an innocent perſon, and from whom you never received any diſpleaſure ; an Infant, a Prince, a King, without excepting Fathers or Mothers ; you may Challenge into the fields, aſſaſſinate publickly, kill

kill by surprise, cause to die secret, by poyson or otherwise; for preservation of the life, honour or goods, and even for the least thing, as for an Apple; and all these without sin or punishment; what mortals can desire more, we know not.

CHAP. IX.

Of Theft.

1. **T**Heft is no mortal sin, if he that steals doth believe that his Father, Master or he from whom he steals the goods, would have given him them, if he had asked him, or if he had known he had need of them, or when he makes no account of the goods which are stolen from them, or when he is of such a disposition, that he would not have him that had stolen them from him, obliged therefore to any great punishment. *Less. de Just. & Jure, lib. 2. c. 41. d. 9. n. 79. p. 496.*

2. Theft, which Men and Maid-Servants commit in Meats and Drinks, are no great sins, though insensibly they amount unto a notable value; if they steal them only to eat and drink them, themselves. *Less. de Just. & Jure, lib. 2. c. 12. d. 8. n. 48. p. 118. Escob. tr. 1. Exam. 9. n. 25. p. 162.*

3. A Woman may take and purloin money from her Husband upon divers occasions, and amongst others, she may take it to game withal, to buy her cloaths, and to get other things she stands * in need of. *Escob. tr. 1. exam. 9. n. 13.*

4. The poor in extraordinary necessity may steal from the rich with a safe Conscience. *Vasquez de Eleemosyna. c. 4. n. 45. Provinc. Letter. 11. fo. 177. Tambur. lib. 5. decal. c. 1. sect. 1. n. 12.*

5. He who taketh what is anothers, doth him no wrong if he made no use of it, or was not like to use it; neither is he obliged to restitution. *Em. Sa. verbo, Furtum. c. 6. p. 292.*

6. He who steals frequently by little at a time, so to gather together a notable sum, is not obliged to restitution when it's not done with intention to steal this great sum. *Exam. Sa. verb. Furtum, n. 8. Escob. tr. 1. Exam. 4. n. 23. p. 161.*

7. Where a man hath by many petty Thefts proceeded unto a great sum, he is not obliged under pain of damnation to restore any of it, because he only sinned venially. *Banny in his Sum. c. 10. p. 143.* By this a man may enrich himself with the goods of another, provided he takes not too much at once.

8. If a man finds any thing which doth belong to another, he may appropriate it to himself; and though the true owner appears afterwards, he is not obliged to quit the possession of it; and if he shall alienate or spend it without fraud or unjust contrivance simply and honestly, the Owner comes and presents himself, he is not obliged to restore any thing unto him, but what he hath put out to use, and whereby he is become more wealthy. *Banny in his Sum. c. 13. p. 185, 186. Layman. lib. 3. tr. 1. c. 5. n. 24.*

9. A person after he hath made a renuntiation of his Goods unto his Creditors, may in Conscience substract and keep one part of his Goods to maintain his Family and his Port. *Banny's Sum. c. 11. p. 154.*

10. It's lawful for Servants to rob their Masters to make their Wages proportionable to their Service. *Myst. of Jesuit. p. 126. Letter. 6. fo. 8.*

11. A religious man may quit his habit, and go and steal, as well as go incognito to the Stewes. *Myst. of Jesuit. p. 69.*

12. A Son may with a safe conscience steal money from his Father. *Addit. to the Myst. of Jesuit. p. 93. §. 12.*

CHAP. X.

Of Deceit.

1. **A** Vintner who hath better Wine than ordinary, for that he may not sell it by reason of some publique order, above the common price, he may recompence himself therein by mingling water therewith, because those who buy this Wine have no prejudice thereby. *Escob. tr. 3. exam. 6. n. 70. p. 423.* The same may be done with grain; he may mingle so much of Rie with his Wheat to reduce it to the quality of common grain which is sold at the same price with his. *Amicus de Just. & Jure, disp. 2. sect. 6. n. 87. p. 282.*

2. A Treasurer, a Factor, Solicitor, a Servant, and such like, may Traffick with their Master's Money without his privity, and retain the profit for themselves. *Escob. tr. 3. exam. 4. n. 95. p. 392.*

3. A Taylor who hath been accustomed to buy Cloath or Silk by command from another to make his cloathes, goes on this occasion most commonly to a Shop of a Merchant, who for this reason sells him a good pennyworth; the Taylor may retain to himself the benefit of his good Market; because the Merchant finds his advantage therein, therefore the Taylor ought to have his advantage thereof. Secondly, because this practice is past into a custom. *Fillut. Tom. 2. tr. 35. c. 6. n. 149. Escob. tr. 3. exam. 6. n. 60. p. 421.*

4. If the Magistrate hath regulated the Price and Weights of Flesh, and the Measures of Wine, so that the price is not sufficient for the charge, and for their pains, and the wayes of those who sell these Merchandizes, they may diminish the weight and the measure so far, as is necessary, to satisfie all these things. *Amicus, de Just. & Jure, d. 21. sect. 6. n. 87. p. 282.* And being examined by a Judge, whether he hath sold it too dear, or hath changed the Weight or Measures, he may say he hath not, and assure him, That he hath sold according to the price appointed; and that he hath observed the weight and measure intending, according to the money that he hath received. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 3. c. 6. n. 29. p. 28.*

5. If one thinks and probably believes that the price which is set upon any Merchandize, is unjust, and that for this reason, he who sells recompences himself for this injustice by selling by false Weights, or by some other way, being afterwards examined by a Judge upon these facts, he may deny all upon oath. *Escob. tr. 1. exam. 3. n. 34. p. 75.*

6. If a man hath run into debt to supply his debaucheries, he may frustrate all his Creditors, and continue to live in luxury, by renouncing his estate; for he that renounceth his estate with safety to his Conscience, may retain so much thereof, as is necessary for him and his Family to live in honour. *Escob. tr. 3. exam. 2. n. 163.*

7. If a man gets money unjustly, and mingles it with his other the like money which did belong unto him, insomuch that one cannot distinguish them; by this means he gains to himself the property of the money, and is become the just owner and lawful possessor of it: Therefore if a Merchant or Tradesman hath received more money of his Customers than is due to him, if he mingles this with his other money that they cannot be distinguished from each other, the party who hath paid this money comes to the Merchant and demands it, he is not obliged to repay it; because that he received it in payment and so took it on good account, and in honest simplicity. *Escob. tr. 3. exam. 2. n. 107. p. 362. Vasquez de Restitutione, c. 9. sect. 2. dubium ultimum.*

8. When Children are grown up and are employed by their Fathers in their Shops, Trades, or other their Affairs, if their Fathers do not content them and give them a just recompence for their pains, it's lawful for them in conscience to

take so much of their Father's Goods secretly for their recompence according to the proportion of their labour and pains. *Ezech. 17. 1. exam. 10. n. 31. p. 163.* So that Children are permitted to estimate and rate their own labour and pains, and pay themselves with their own hands; and this estimation depends on their own Judgments and Wills.

9. Cheating is lawful by virtue of the contract *Maliatra*: as when a man buys a Commodity for 30 l. to be paid within a year; and then sells it immediately to him of whom he bought it, for half so much money. *Myft. of Jesuit. p. 10.*

He who prudently maketh use of these Maxims of the divinity of the *Jesuits*, may do all his affairs by deceit, and yet not pass for all that for a Cheat, and it's but reasonable, that if a Butcher, Vintner, or other person be ill husbands, or an ill chapman, or suffer himself to be cheated or buy too dear, that the Publique pay for all this: for if the Merchant be an ill buyer, he may be a wicked seller; and cheat in selling, because he was cheated in buying.

CHAP. XI.

Of Oaths, Promises, mental Reservations, and of Equivocations.

IN conduct of affairs to be well instructed in the subtilities and inventions of the *Jesuits* are of great use; which may be referred to equivocations in words; and want of intention in Oaths and Promises: The one is a means to say what you will without lying; and the other an expedient to swear and promise all things without being obliged to perform any thing.

1. A man may make a promise without any intention to promise; but in case he had an intention to promise, but no intention to perform, then he is obliged to his promise, but not obliged to perform what he promised; the same of an oath. *Sanct. op. mor. lib. 3. c. 10. n. 7, 8. p. 42. Gr. Valentia. 22. d. 6. q. 6. p. 1.*

2. A man may make a promise without any intention to promise, and so he is not obliged to perform; because he had no intention to promise: and therefore if he be asked if he made any such promise, he may with a safe conscience say, No; intending that he had not promised by any promise to oblige him; and by consequence he may also swear, for otherwise he should be constrained to pay that which he owes not. *Fillus. Tom. 2. tr. 25. n. 323. p. 161.* And therefore he may safely say, That he owes not that which he hath promised, and that he lies not, in forswearing it; because, in promising and in swearing, he had no intention to promise or swear, no more than to perform what he promised.

3. If you have made a promise or an oath, and you doubt whether you had an intent to oblige your self; it's probable you are not obliged to keep it. *Tamb. decal. 1. c. 3. sect. 7. tit. V. n. 6.*

4. To feign in an important matter, and to vow only with ones lips, is but a venial sin, because it's only a lye which contains no irreverence towards God. *Tamb. decal. 3. c. 12. sect. 1. n. 3.*

5. If to promise without an intention to promise, and to promise without an intention to do what is promised, be not sufficient, the better to carry on designs, and to cause your projections to prosper, and to gain belief, it's lawful to add an oath.

6. He who desires not to swear, (the better to obtain belief) may find out many wayes to speak, and to affirm, which passeth commonly for oaths, but indeed are not; as for example, If I swear by God; wherefore do you not believe me? If this be not, I have no faith in God, I renounce God. This is as true as the Gospel; Before God this is so; God knows it's so; On my faith, by my faith, God be my witness; I may swear by God, by Jesus Christ; I will swear by God; though the ignorant, and those who do not look nearly to them, take these speeches for oaths; but they are not, because they assert nothing, and they are imperfect discourses,

courses, and have no determined sence. *Escob. tr. 1. Exam. 3. n. 17. p. 72. Sanch. op. mor. lib. 3. c. 2. n. 16, 17, 19, 20. p. 8.*

7. When one is resolved to swear, you may choose words of double meaning, and make use of a mental restriction the better to effect your ends; and this is warrantable according to the most Learned Doctors amongst the Jesuits: for no man is obliged by virtue of his oath, beyond his intention; for an oath cannot oblige in conscience beyond the intent of him which swears, and by consequence he that hath no intention to swear, cannot be obliged to any thing at all. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 2. c. 10. n. 12, 13. p. 42.*

8. The art of mental restriction or reservation, is an art of great use, and must be well studied, and none can teach the Theorie or Practice of it so well as the Jesuits, they being the great Doctors of the faculty of Equivocation. This doctrine shall be illustrated by some few Examples; If a promise by oath to pay a certain sum of Money, be drawn from a man unjustly, or by force, he that swears in this manner, may use an equivocation in these terms; I swear to you, I will, give this mony; intending that he would give it to him, to whom he sware, or to some other, because these words may receive either of these two senses. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 2. c. 10. n. 37. p. 29.*

If a Woman be excommunicated for departing from her Husband, because she knows of some secret impediment which makes the Marriage void, being at the point of death, she is obliged, that she may receive absolution to swear, That if she recover her health, she will return to her Husband; she may promise and swear it, intending in her mind, If I be obliged thereunto, or if it shall please me at that time. *Sanch. lib. 3. c. 6. n. 40. p. 30.*

9. If in the tongue in which one expresses an oath, the name of God signifie divers things, it will be lawful to swear by the Name of God, taking it in some other signification: According to this rule a man may safely swear by the Name of Jesus Christ, because there are others named *Jesus*, besides the Son of God, and that this word, *Christ*, is attributed to divers Persons in Scripture, and that not only Christians, but to Jews.

10. When one is required to make oath unto a person in a case in which he believes that he is not obliged to swear; he may do it without fear of Perjury; he may make use of the one or the other of these two expedients; First to take the words wholly he uses in swearing, and which are false in their true sence, in a quite different sence, such as he pleases, provided it be true: Secondly, to give no sence at all to his words, and to take them materially, that is to say, as sounds which signifie nothing. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 3. c. 6. n. 10. p. 24.*

11. If a person be ignorant, and cannot make right use of mental reservation, upon occasion, he may swear plainly without obliging himself in any sort whatsoever, provided he hath no intent to swear, nor to perform that which he swears. *Escobar. tr. 1. exam. 1. n. 37. p. 76.*

12. To establish this knowledg of equivocation in the World, and to facilitate the practice of it amongst all sorts of people, the Jesuits have delivered to their disciples divers excellent rules, and examples for the perfecting of them in this marvellous art of equivocation; therefore, if you be asked, If you have eaten of such a dish; you may answer, I have not eaten of such a dish; intending in your mind, to day; though the intention of him that asked, was to know if you had ever eaten of it. *Fillut. op. mor. Tom. 2. tr. 25. c. 11. n. 327. p. 204.*

If one enquire whether the Prince be at Court, he may say and swear it too, without any great sin, that he is there, (though he be not there) intending that he is there in picture. *Escob. tr. 1. exam. 1. n. 35. p. 76.*

If one demands of a man to borrow mony, which he indeed hath, but which he will not, and which he is not obliged to lend; he may swear that he hath it not at all; meaning not to lend him, or meaning not in another place than in
that

that where he laid it up to be kept. *Fillut. op. mor. Tom. 2. tr. 25. c. 11. n. 15.*

If a Witness be interrogated juridically if he know a thing, provided the Judge ask him not whether he hath heard it spoken; he may swear he knows it not, having only heard it spoken. *Fillut. op. mor. Tom. 2. tr. 25. c. 7. n. 5. p. 32.*

If he be interrogated by a Judge, Whether he had done such a thing? he may safely swear he hath not done it, when he hath done it; intending in his mind some other thing, which he hath not in truth done, or some other day than that on which he did it, or some other circumstance as he pleases, so it be true; he doth not lye, neither is he forsworn. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 3. c. 6. n. 15.* This is a rare way to justify all manner of lies, and perjuries: The greatest Impostors may make use hereof to maintain themselves in these crimes.

And it's always justifiable when necessary, or advantagious in any thing that concerns a man's Health, Honour or Estate. *Zanch. op. mor. p. 2. lib. 3. c. 6. n. 12. Provinc. Letter. 9. §. 129, 130.* *Fillutus* assigns a way much more secure than the former, to avoid lying; and that is when a man having said, *I swear I have not done such a thing*, he adds, whispering to himself, *this day*. *Fillut. tr. 25. c. 11. n. 331.* This is to speak truth towards himself, and lie to others. Men will be often at a loss if they have not this Science.

13. It's not enough to know the Rules of any Mystery, if it be not known how to reduce them to practice.

Therefore there are two Rules given by the Jesuits, that men may have change, and make use sometimes of one, and sometimes of the other.

The first is, to have an intention to pronounce the words materially, that is to say, as if they signified nothing; and to take from them in his mind their proper signification not desiring they should have any at all. And that this method may be made easie to understand, take this example: If a man be interrogated by a Judge if he did such a fact; he may safely swear he did it not; with this mental restriction (*this day*), though he did it at another day. *Fillut. op. mor. Tom. 2. tr. 25. c. 12. n. 328. p. 204.*

The second rule or method is, To have an Intention to compose ones discourse, not only of words, which are audibly pronounced, but also of those which are secretly reserved in ones mind, it being free for those who speak, to express their thoughts wholly or in part. *Fillut. ibidem.*

14. It's lawful in our defence at all times to make use of equivocation, though he who doth examine us, do press us and make us swear not to use them, but to answer him without making use of equivocation: he may safely swear, understanding secretly that he doth it as far as he is obliged to speak clearly, and to expound himself, or by forming some other thought, which may make him answer true. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 3. c. 6. n. 45. p. 30.*

If any one be examined by a Judge if he did such a thing, he may swear he hath not done it, intending his answer, Not in that manner as the Judge examines him maliciously, but in the manner he ought to examin him in the quality of a Judge. *Sanch. ibidem.*

15. When a Prince commands a Subject to do such a thing when he receives his orders, he promises to obey him; though he be resolved to do nothing of that he shall command him, by making use of this mental restriction, saying in himself, I will do this not as you command me, but as you ought to command me. *Sanch. ibidem.*

16. A Wife or Children being called before a Judge to declare and confess what they have put aside or taken out from, or usurped of the moveables or Goods of the deceased, are not in conscience obliged to confess, or declare the same, but because they may be brought to swear, they may make use of this expedient that they may not lie, and so doing forswear themselves, the prudent Confessor may teach them that they are to frame a conception in their mind, according

according to which they may form their answer and oath, which they may make by the command of the Judge, to justify and make him believe their innocence. *Bauny his Sum. c. 11. p. 156.*

17. One is discharged of his oath, though in doing what he swears to do, he hath an express intent not to do or fulfil it. *Less. lib. 1. c. 37. d. 10. n. 59.*

18. If I swear to do such an act, and have no intention to swear, though I do not perform the act, I am not forsworn, because an oath depends on the intention of him who swears. *Em. Sa. verb. Jurament. n. 1. p. 205.*

19. If a man lies in using equivocation without any necessity obliging him thereunto, and swears to confirm this Equivocation, he doth neither lie nor commit perjury, because he that speaks and swears in that sort, hath no intention to speak or swear falsely. *Fillut. To. 2. tr. 25. c. 11. n. 331. p. 205.* This Maxim is of admirable use to licence the Lies and Oaths which some do make use of ordinarily to deceive others, and those who forswear themselves before Judges.

20. Oaths, which are made without actual advertency and consideration, which of themselves are sufficient to a mortal sin, are not of themselves new sins properly, because of the custom of swearing, how great soever they be, though no retraction be made of them. *Santh. mor. par. 1. lib. 3. c. 5. 8. 28. p. 21.*

21. If one commit Perjury through natural inadvertency, or because of an ill custom he hath to forswear, it is no mortal sin, because he doth forswear himself without perceiving it at all. *Fillut. mor. To. 2. tr. 25. c. 11. p. 373.*

22. When a man blasphemes customarily without having full knowledge thereof, he doth not sin mortally. *Fill. ibidem.*

23. It is a less sin to swear in common talk by the holy Name of God, than it is to eat an Egg in Lent. *Santh. Fillut.*

24. It is lawful as well in Judgment as out of Judgment, to swear with a mental reservation without any regard to the intent of him who obliges a man to swear. *Myst. of Jesuit. p. 10.*

25. To call God to witness to a light inconsiderable Lie, is not so great an irreverence, as that a man should or must be damned for it. *Myst. of Jesuitism, p. 10. f. 5.*

CHAP. XII.

Of the Doctrine of Probability.

That Opinion is probable which hath one only Author of Reputation, or one reason to maintain it; and that which is supported by a probable opinion, is simply good and lawful, and a man may safely in Conscience act by it. *Em. Sa. verbo Dubium. n. 3. p. 183.* Nay, though many Doctors do positively hold the contrary, yet if any one Doctor who hath examined and weighed the Reasons of those who hold the contrary, doth say, That the action is good and lawful; the opinion is probable, and you may in Conscience act by it. Therefore if a Priest, of whom I have a good opinion for his integrity and parts, shall tell you; It is lawful for you to burn a City or any other place, though it be against the Principles of Justice or Charity; yet to you it is probable, and so you may safely fire the City without sin. And the most universally condemned Crimes may become lawful to you for to act, if a Priest in whom you have a Confidence for his Learning and Honesty, shall tell you they are lawful. *Estob. in prefat. Theolog. problemat.* And in case you have a great desire to do any thing, and can find no opinion to rely on, and to assure you it is probable; it is enough that you are probably assured, that the opinion is probable; so that probability is not only sufficient to excuse sin, but probability of a probability. *Tamb. lib. 1. decal. c. 3. sect. 3. n. 126.*

2. When two opinions are probable, the one as well as the other, we may

justly prefer in the practice that which is less probable, though not so false, if you like it best, or may be more acceptable to others. *Azor. lib. 2. c. 16. p. 126. Discast. de Confessione, tr. 4. d. 9. d. 8. n. 134.* A Counsellor at Law may counsel his Client that adviseth with him, not according to his own opinion, but the contrary which other Counsellors hold probable, if it be more favourable and acceptable to the Client, though he doth know and believe assuredly that the opinion of the other Counsellor is false in the Theory, and therefore not to be followed in the Practice. *Layman. lib. 1. tr. 1. c. 3.* Nay, a Learned Counsellor may give to Plaintiff and Defendant, counsels quite contrary according to contrary probable opinions. *Layman. ibidem. Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 9. n. 26.*

3. It's lawful in Conscience for a man to quit his own proper opinion, though more probable to follow the probable opinion of another though less sure, because, he who believes an opinion probable, acting according to that opinion, ought not to be deemed as rash and imprudent: Upon this Principle *Pilat* acted when he put *Jesus Christ* to death, quitting his proper judgment, by which he believed him to be innocent, to follow the opinion of the *Jews*, who maintained that he was worthy of death. Nay, *Pilat* herein, according to the Jesuits, ought to be justified, because he followed a probable Opinion, and more than probable, because it was not the opinion of one Doctor, but of all the Doctors and Priests of the *Jews*, That *Jesus* was a Malefactor and deserved death. *Matth. 25.*

4. When one believes assuredly that an Opinion is false, and that we cannot follow it directly in the conduct of some person, we may send this person to those who hold with it, and counsel him to follow their advice. *Layman. lib. 1. c. 5. p. 7.*

5. If you meet with two contrary Opinions, you may follow them both in different affairs, and even in the same affair also, acting and giving contrary counsels, now after the one, and then after the other. *Layman. lib. 1. c. 5. p. 6.*

6. A man may hold an opinion probable, when he is persuaded that he himself or some other can answer the reasons upon which that opinion is grounded, and it's safe in Conscience to act according to such a probable opinion. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 9. n. 6. p. 28.*

7. When a Superior and those which are under his charge be of different opinions, the Inferior is not bound to obey his Superior: and therefore when a Subject believes according to a probable opinion, that the Commands of his Prince are unjust, or that he exceedeth the bounds of his Jurisdiction, he may disobey him, because it's lawful for all men to follow a probable opinion. *Escob. in pram. Exam. 3. n. 31. p. 30.*

8. The privileges of Probability cannot only dispense with an Inferior for the obedience which he owes to his Superior, but may elevate him above his Superior, and to oblige the Superior to obey his Subject. Upon this Principle a Confessor is obliged to follow the probable opinion of his Penitent, and quit his own opinion, though more probable, because the Penitent grounding himself upon a probable opinion, hath a right unto absolution. *Escob. in pram. Exam. 3. c. 6. n. 27. p. 25.* And the Confessor is obliged to absolve the Penitent against his own proper opinion, when the Penitent following the Maxims of a probable opinion, believes that he may do that, which the Confessor believes he may not do, according to his probable opinion. *Amicus. Tom. 3. disp. 15. sect. 2. n. 90. p. 212.*

9. It's probable that an Excise is justly established by a Prince, it's probable on the other side, that it's unjust, you being at present appointed by the Prince to collect this Impost, require it according to this Opinion, which maintains that it's just, and therefore it's lawful for you to levy it without doing any injustice: but if to morrow, or the same day, you being a Merchant, may secretly defraud this Impost or Excise, following the Opinion that it's unjust. *Tamb. lib. 1. Theol. c. 3. sect. 5. n. 1, 2, 3. p. 21.*

10. A man may, relying on an Opinion sweet and indulgent, but probable; disobey his Prince or Superior in a thing in which it's probable that he is not obliged to obey, but it's more probable that he is obliged to the Prince or Superior following the Opinion which is more safe, judges that he ought to obey, and therefore that he hath sinned; the Prince or Superior hath reason to command obedience, the Inferior hath reason not to obey, both founded upon probable Opinions; in this case the Prince or Superior is rash, if he judges that the Inferior sins, because it's not probable, that he sins who follows a probable Opinion, and so it being probable, that the Inferior hath not sinned; the Prince or Superior shall be unjust, if he treats him as guilty; for where there is no fault, there is no punishment. *Cat. in Com. in Reg. 6. Bernardi. lib. 1. n. 65.*

11. He who believes that it's more probable that we cannot in Conscience follow that of the two Opinions which is most probable, may yet follow it himself, if he believes that it's also probable, that he may follow it. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 17. p. 30.*

12. It's probable, that the loss of Reputation may, and may not be compensated with Money; therefore this day, you being defamed, desire satisfaction in Money, and to morrow or this day you having defamed another, may safely deny to allow him the same compensation. *Tamb. lib. 1. Theol. c. 3. sect. 5. n. 1, 2, 3. p. 21.*

13. A lawful Prince doth publish Just Laws for his Subjects to obey, and they have no cause to complain thereof; or just reason to refuse them: the Subjects do sin, and it may be said they do not sin at all; for there is great Authority and Reasons on each side to make both Opinions probable, and to give liberty to which the Jesuits please; but the more safe, and more probable is to disobey. *Efc. Tom. 1. lib. 5. f. 2. c. 14. prob. 13. p. 160.*

But Priests and Ecclesiastics must be exempted from obedience to the Laws of Princes; for they are not Subjects of necessity and obligation, but only out of respect and good example towards Princes Laws, which regard the Government of their States, and which derogate not from the Ecclesiastic State. *Efcob. Theol. mor. To. 1. lib. 5. c. 15. prob. 19. p. 162.*

14. All probable Opinions are of themselves as safe the one as the other; but the more pleasant, though they be less probable, are always more profitable and more safe, because they are more easie, and by consequence more favourable to Temporal Interest. *Cat. in Com. in Regal. Sancti Bernardi. lib. 1. d. 6. n. 58. Idem, Theol. fundam. p. 134.*

15. As it's impossible that an Opinion which hath the approbation of many Learned Doctors should not be probable, so it's impossible to reject it; none of their Propositions can cease to be probable, if the contrary doth not become an Article of Faith. *Layman. lib. 1. c. 5. p. 2.*

By these Maxims, following a probable Opinion, you are exempted from all sin: you may act, do, or say what you please, and you are safe. The Gospel of Christ made men sinners, but these make them all innocent. If there be two persons which do the same thing, he who knows not this doctrine, sins; and he who doth, sins not. If things and actions should be measured by the Scripture and the Fathers of the Church, they could not be done without sin; therefore it was necessary that the Jesuits should by their Prudence moderate things so, that those things which persons could not act by the Law of God without sin, they may safely do and act by these Maxims. They have discovered many new ways to Heaven, which were heretofore unknown to the Church and Jesus Christ himself, who hath not spoken any thing of them in his Gospel; if he doth, it hath been only to condemn them. Following the Principles of these good men, you will find it's not only easie to be saved, but it's almost impossible to be damned; There can be no affair of Conscience so troublesome or so desperate,

rate, for which Expedients may not be found; nor any Crimes so black, which may not easily be excused and justified; there was never a better contrivance invented in the World, than this of probable Opinion; for there are but two Conditions required to make an Opinion probable; First, that it be founded on Reasons in some sort considerable, which will be very easie; for no man hath formed an Opinion, but doth believe that the Reasons which he brings are good enough to support what he maintains. The second condition, That there be no convincing reason for the contrary; which is no less easie than the former; for a reason may be convincing in respect of one man, which is not to another: and an obstinate man will always think his Reasons best; but in case you cannot answer the reasons on the contrary, you may persuade your self some other more Learned may do it, and so it doth remain probable, and you may safely act in Conscience by and according to it, though that which you act or do be against the Divine Law, and condemned by God in Scripture. *Sanch. op. mor. lib. 1. c. 9. n. 17. p. 30.*

CHAP. XIII.

Of Judges and Witnesses.

1. IF the right of the parties seem equal on both sides, the Judge may take money or a present of one party, to give advantage whether he pleaseth, because he may do favour, and this favour may be valued by money; and because for the most part the Judge loseth the friendship of one of the parties. *Esco. tr. 3. ex. 2. n. 111. p. 363.*

2. If the opinions are so doubtful and divided, that it is in the power of the Judges to follow which he pleaseth; if one of the parties make him a present to gain him to his side, the Judge doth not offend against Justice in receiving that which is given him to follow one of the two Parties rather than the other. *Esco. tr. 6. Exam. 6. n. 44. p. 743.*

3. A Judge giving Judgment, may follow a probable opinion, leaving that which is more probable; nay he may judge against his own proper opinion, as did Pilate, who condemned Jesus Christ, after he had declared publicly, that he believed him innocent. *Esco. in prem. Exam. 3. c. 3. n. 125.*

4. When the right of the Parties is not clear, or when it happens that there are different opinions concerning the sense of the Law; when the one opinion is as probable as the other, it is in the power of the Judge to chuse which he pleaseth, and to follow it in his judgment. *Sanch. lib. 1. c. 9. n. 45.* And he may, if it gives no scandal, judge one while according to one opinion, and another time according to another opinion. *Ibidem.* For if he may choose of two probable opinions, that which he pleaseth, it follows, That he may follow sometimes the one opinion, and sometimes the other, as he pleaseth; but if one of the two opinions be more probable than the other, the Judge may pronounce judgment according to that he likes best, and even to follow that which he believes to be less probable. *Ibidem.* And the Judge doth not herein behave himself imprudently or rashly, guiding himself as he doth by a probable opinion. *Ibidem.*

5. If a person who hath born false witness through ignorance or inadvertency, which occasions the condemnation of a man, and the loss of life or member to another; he is not obliged after that he understands the truth, to retract his false testimony, for fear of exposing himself to great evils. *Toler. lib. 5. c. 59. Disc. lib. 2. tr. 2. disp. 8. dub. 7. n. 92.* For it is lawful to kill an innocent person, after we have slandered him, rather than to expose our selves to danger by retracting; though it is not so much the offence or Hang-man, as the false witness which puts him to death.

6. If a Witness corrupted by Money, hide or retire himself before he hath been legally

legally examined or cited into the Court; he is not obliged to restore the money he received in this manner. *Dicass. lib. 2. tit. 2. d. 4. dub. 8. n. 156.*

7. If a man is accused of a Crime which cannot be legally proved by the Accuser; he may not only deny the crime, but say, That the Accuser lies, and slanders him. *Tamb. lib. 9. decal. c. 2. sect. 2. n. 2.* For it's no lie to say unto a man he lies, when he knows that he speaks truth, and to slander an accuser as a slanderer, where he accuses us of a crime which we have committed, of two accusers the one speaks the truth, the other lies; the one objects a true crime, and the other a false, yet in that said the truth is the liar; and he who objects a true crime, is a slanderer; which is admirable divinity, and may be made use of in conduct of affairs.

8. If a man cannot defend himself against a false and unjust Witness but by slandering of him, he may without sin, impose on him so many false Crimes as will be necessary for his defence. *Tamb. lib. 9. decal. c. 2. f. 2. n. 4, 5, 6, 7.* If he doth it, he sinneth not against Justice, and by consequence he is not obliged to restitution. *Ibidem.* So that by this Maxim to defend our selves from true but secret crimes, and whereof there is no publick proof, we may say to the honestest man in the World, who would inform against us in a Court of Justice, That he is a Sodomite, Heretick, Excommunicate, &c. And we may for proof of this Slander, make use of false witnesses, counterfeit false Deeds and Writings, and corrupt publick Notaries to subscribe them, without committing of any injustice at all, though the Scriptures do forbid it as a Sin. So that you may observe the Pious Care of these holy Fathers, in framing Maxims stable to all times, persons and things. The Gospel of Christ may be useful to some ends and designs, but being not equally serviceable to all, many times it's to be laid aside; for if you make too much use of it, it will give a check unto your designs; and obstruct your designs if you act according to its directions.

9. A false Witness, is he who chargeth one with a false Crime; an unjust Witness, is he who accuses one of true Crimes, but secret, and which he cannot prove according to the form of Justice. That Witness is to be held for a slanderer, who cannot prove the crime which he accuses one of, and by consequence having accused unjustly, he is obliged unto restitution. *Dicass. lib. 2. tit. 3. d. 12. p. 3. dub. 18. n. 285.*

CHAP. XIV.

Of Restitution & Satisfaction.

1. **T**hey which by Traffick, Merchandize, Usurious Contracts or Bargains, believing them to be good, have gained great Wealth, being invincibly ignorant, that such manner of dealings were forbidden, and unlawful, are not obliged to make Restitution of those Goods so gotten, although they have so gained them, they not being informed of the injustice of such Contracts. *Bauny in his Sum. p. 156.*

2. If you intreat a Souldier to beat his Neighbour, or to burn the Farm of a man who hath offended you; if the Soldier doth these Outrages, you are not obliged out of your Estate to repair the damage, which proceeds from thence; for no man is obliged to restore, if he hath not violated Justice; and he doth not, who submits himself to another's pleasure, and only intreats of him a favour. *Bauny in his Sum. c. 11. p. 200.*

3. A person who is indebted for very great Sums of Money, to the prejudice of his Creditors gives away part of his Goods; he to whom the gift is made, is not obliged to restore any part thereof to his Creditors, if he be not con-

strained thereunto by Law. *Benny in his Sum. cap. 11. p. 200.*

4. There is no natural Precept which obliges us in this Life to make Satisfaction for Temporal pains. *Fillur. mor. tr. 6. c. 9. n. 213. p. 159.*

5. God punishing sins in Purgatory, when satisfaction is not made in this life, the Sinner may without injustice refer satisfaction unto the other life. *Fillur. Ibidem.* And though the Sinner defers satisfaction until the next life, he loses not by this, neither Bliss or the Love of God; and though he retards the enjoyment thereof, yet the loss made by this delay may be repayed. *Ibid.*

6. That which one receives for doing any dishonest action, as to cause a man to be killed, for committing of fornication, for defaming our Neighbours, for bearing of false witness, may in conscience be detained, and is not subject to restitution, if the action be done. *Fillur. mor. Tom. 2. tr. 32. c. 4. n. 103. p. 364.* But if the action be not done, you ought not to pay him till he hath performed the action; as if a man promises to pay unto *Tinius* 100 l. to assassinate *Caius*, till he hath done the fact, he can require nothing; and if he hath executed it, common right requires that you pay him what you promised to him. *Layman. lib. 3. tr. 4. c. 16. n. 8. p. 379.* For the pains which he hath taken, and the danger which he exposed himself unto for your sake, deserves to be well recompensed with money.

7. A Judge who hath taken money for an unjust Judgment, is not obliged to make restitution; no more than a Murderer who hath taken money to commit a murder. *Lessus de Just. et Just. lib. 2. c. 14. disp. 8. n. 54. p. 145.* But if the Judge hath taken money to give a just sentence, he is obliged to restore that which he hath received, because he hath done no more than he ought to have done; but in giving an unjust Judgment, he runs the hazard and loss of his place, and so is not bound to restore that which he hath received.

8. This Divinity of these good Fathers is very indulgent, and merciful to Sinners; for by their Doctrine, this Judge doth deserve a reward; but by the Laws of God, a most severe punishment.

9. If a man hath done wrong unto another, he is obliged to make restitution, if he did it not expressly on design, and with knowledge. *Escob. tr. 3. exam. 2. n. 8. p. 348.* For only Sins of malice oblige us to restitution, and not those of Infirmity or Ignorance.

10. Where it's impossible to make restitution without diminishing ones retinue and expence, so as to be taken notice of; he is not bound to restitution. *Escob. tr. 3. exam. 2. c. 4. n. 37. p. 353.*

11. Whatsoever wrong a man hath done or caused to be done, to ones Neighbour to hinder his wealth, or to procure his hurt, no restitution is to be made if he hath used no violence, but only Prayers, Promises, Presents to deceive him or cause another to deceive him or wrong him. *Escob. tr. 3. exam. 2. n. 160. p. 370.*

12. A man is not obliged to restore what he hath stolen, by trivial and inconsiderable Theft, whatsoever the total sum thereof may amount unto. *Ad 30 the Myst. of Jesuitisme. p. 112. s. 16.*

13. A man who is indebted for a very great sum of money, to the practice of his Creditors, is not obliged to restore any part thereof to his Creditors, if he is not able to do so. *Ad 30 the Myst. of Jesuitisme. p. 112. s. 16.*

14. A man who is indebted for a very great sum of money, to the practice of his Creditors, is not obliged to restore any part thereof to his Creditors, if he is not able to do so. *Ad 30 the Myst. of Jesuitisme. p. 112. s. 16.*

There is no Person which obligeth us directly to pay to God to love
believe or hope in him, but only when it's necessary to acquire some
good, or to remove some evil.

A Summary Account of the Sacred Doctrines, Holy Principles, and Pious Maxims, contained in this Gospel, necessary for all Christians to understand, and which will much advance Devotion and Holiness of Life.

Whatever distractions or evil thoughts come into our minds when
we are praying, it may be not our company, but negligence, the sin is not in
the prayer.

Christ commands us to receive the Sacrament of Baptism, a Tyrant for
this as upon him of our lives, we must obey the Tyrant rather than Christ.

CHAP. I. 2. 3.

1. **T**He Bishop of *Rome* is God.
2. He who is not obedient to the decrees of the Pope, is a Heretick.
3. The Pope is Lord of all temporalities upon Earth.
4. No man ought to lay unto the Pope, Why dost thou thus?
5. The Pope may dispense with or against the commands of Christ or the Apostles.
6. The Pope's Will is a Law.
7. All Nations and Kingdoms are under the Pope's Jurisdiction.
8. God hath delivered over unto the Pope, the power and rule of Heaven and Earth.
9. The whole World is the Pope's Inheritance.
10. The Pope hath an almighty infallibilitie and cannot err.
11. The Pope can do all that God himself can do, only Sin excepted.
12. He hath power of making Sin, to be no Sin; and that which is no Sin, to be Sin.
13. He can give Empires and Kingdoms to whom he pleaseth, and depose the Possessors of them.
14. The Pope may depose Kings by his power, if they be either negligent in their Administration of their Government, or do not extirpate all Hereticks out of their Dominions.
15. If a King turns Heretick, he hath no right to his Kingdom; and no man ought to think it strange if the Pope depose him.
16. If Kings will not be obedient to the Church of *Rome*, then may the Pope by the great power from Heaven, very justly depose them; and the Subjects themselves if the Pope commands them, must take up Arms against them.
17. The Pope can quit Subjects from their Obedience and Allegiance which they owe to their King.
18. The power of the Pope is greater than that of the Apostles, having power to derogate from the Sayings and Words of the Pope.
19. The Doctrine of the Pope is the infallible rule of Faith, and the holy Scripture, hath taken its force, and doth take it from his Holiness, and he that doth not believe this is an Heretick.
20. The Pope is he by whom Kings reign, according as it's said, *By me Kings reign.*

CHAP. IV.

21. **T** Here is no Precept which obligeth us directly to pray to God to love, believe or hope in him, but only when it's necessary to acquire some good, or to remove some evil.

22. He who prays not to God in a temptation against Chastity, Sins only against Chastity ; for he Sins not omitting prayer, but because of the danger he is in to violate Chastity.

23. In our private Prayers which we make to God it's not necessary to use any Devotion or Attention ; nor are we obliged thereunto ; and in those which are made by command, we are not obliged unto any inward intention, provided that we rehearse them outwardly, and behave our selves decently and with respect.

24. Whatsoever distractions or evil thoughts come into our minds when we are at prayer, if they be not on contempt, but negligence, the sin is but venial.

25. Christ commands us to receive the Sacrament of Baptism, a Tyrant forbids us upon pain of our Lives, we must obey the Tyrant rather than Christ.

26. In receiving the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, it's not necessary to have actual Devotion, for let one be distracted with evil thoughts in the receiving the Sacrament, provided he contemns it not, yet he is a worthy receiver, and only sins venially ; and so if he commits any sin, in the Communion it self.

27. He who hath sinned mortally, and hath remorse for his sins, and hath confessed them to a Priest, may well Communicate, though a little before the Communion he hath sinned mortally.

28. If a man after he hath communicated many times in a bad state, cometh to be converted, he shall receive in an instant, all the graces which were due to so many Communions.

29. It's not necessary that the Priest who finds himself guilty of mortal sin, should Confess himself before he Administers the Sacrament.

30. A Person who hath abundance, after he hath satisfied all his own necessities and those of his Family, having yet a superfluity, is not obliged in a publick Famine to give unto the poor, nor to any one whomsoever, if he see him not in eminent danger to dye with Famine.

31. The precept of giving Alms may be fulfilled; by lending only, without giving any thing.

32. Rich men are not obliged to give Alms but out of their superfluity, and not then, but in case of great necessity ; those things which may exalt us to a better condition, as to Places or Preferment, are not to be accounted superfluous : Therefore Alms are rarely to be given ; for it seldom happens that we have goods superfluous.

33. There is no obligation to love our Neighbour ; it's sufficient not to hate him.

34. There is no absolute Commandment to love God, but when in Scripture we are commanded to love God, they are but Counsels and Advices, and no Commands, for God hath not commanded so much to love him, as not to hate him ; and he ought to be content that we love him, as little as we please, and it sufficeth that we love him much under that we could if we would ; for the least degree of love is enough for him.

35. If we be obliged to love God, we are not obliged to love him above Three or Four Months in our Life ; whereof the first is when we begin to have the use of Reason. 2. At the point of Death. 3. Every Fifth year during Life.

For

For the rest of our time we may love God or the World, as we please.

36. If a man hath committed any mortal sin, he is not obliged to contrition or sorrow for that sin before the Article of his Death.

37. A man may be a Martyr not only without any act of Charity, but also without any act of Faith; and though he suffers without love to God, and though he never thinks of him.

CHAP. V.

38. **H**E that by custom is transported to do evil, as to Swear or Blaspheme, sins not at all, because a man cannot sin without reason, but by an ill custom the use of Reason is taken away; so that he who sinneth out of those ill habits, is in a better condition than he that hath them not; and by often sinning, is put into a state of not sinning any more.

39. Perjury which one commits through natural inadvertency, or because of the custom he hath to Swear, it's no mortal sin.

40. Those who in their Youth, have committed many actions of a vicious nature, which they did not believe to be such, are not obliged to confess them, when they know their nature, because when they committed them, they had not the full use of Reason; and at most they were but venial sins, if any sin at all.

41. The pleasure which is taken in an action of mortal sin, which is done in sleep, drunkenness, madness, or through ignorance, is no sin.

42. He who doth some unlawful act, knowing well that it's forbidden, but not remembring it to be such, when he doth it, is exempt from mortal sin; because forgetfulness or negligence which is the cause we think not of it, the evil we are about to do, is not imputed for sin, if it be not voluntary, if we do not consider that we are obliged to examine that we are about to do.

43. God cannot command or forbid a thing that is in it self slight, under the penalty of mortal sin.

44. He who hath knowledg in the Law, and is ignorant of the penalty which it ordains against those who violate it, doth not incur the penalty.

45. He who hath a will to commit all venial sins, if he were able, sins only venially.

46. No man is obliged to avoid the next occasion of sin, if some great loss will thereby befall him.

47. A thing is not the next occasion of sin, unless it be vicious and a sin of it self.

48. To tell a lye in Preaching on any Doctrinal Point, is but a venial sin.

49. All the breaches of the First and Second Table of the Decalogue are no sins at all, when they are committed by any man out of ignorance, surprize or passion.

CHAP. VI.

Of directing the Intention.

30. **T**O do evil, there must be an evil Intention; but to do good, it's not necessary to have a good Intention.

51. Ecclesiasticks satisfy the Precept of the Church in saying Prayers, when they read them without any inward Intention or Devotion, so they observe outward Decency.

52. If a man speaks never so dishonourably and irreverently of God, it's no blasphemy if he had not a formal intent to blaspheme God and dishonour him.

53. If a man be at Prayers, and hath a bad intent thereunto joyned, as an intent of looking on a Woman dishonestly, it's no sin.

54. If a man be to do an act, and makes protestation that his Intention is not to do any evil; let the act be never so wicked, it's no sin in him.

55. A Mother may with the death of her Daughter, because she cannot match her according to her desire for want of a Portion.

56. You may desire the death of an Enemy, who might do you much hurt; not of hatred to him, but to avoid the damage he might do you.

57. To lye with a Woman, when he representeth to himself, that he is Married to her; it's no evil, but good.

58. A man may accept of a Challenge to Fight a Duel, not with an intention to fight the duel, but only of defending himself.

CHAP. VII.

Of Adultery or Fornication.

59. **T**O lye with a Married Woman is not Adultery, if the Husband doth consent thereto.

60. A Virgin may dispose of her Virginity, and prostitute her self without the consent of Parents, and it's no injury to them.

61. To lye with a Woman considered as his Wife, is no sin.

62. If a drunken or Mad-man lyeth with a woman, it's no sin; because he hath not the use of Reason.

63. There may be a dispensation granted to commit Fornication, because it's not forbidden by the Law of Nature.

64. Men and Women being together, and by that means induced to sin, if their relapses be but once or twice a month, they may continue therein, if they cannot separate without some inconvenience.

65. It's lawful for a woman to retain to her self the price of her Adultery.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Murder.

66. **I**T's lawful for an Honourable Person to kill an assaillant, who would strike him with his Cudgel, or give him a box in the Ear.

67. If a person endeavour to deprive me of my Honour or Reputation before a Person of great Quality, by accusing me of some Crimes; I may kill him, and the same may be done against him, though the sin be true, so it be hid and secret.

68. To defend one's self from an affront which would be given us, it's lawful to prevent the aggressor, by killing him.

69. If a man doth detain from me my Goods, and I cannot in course of Justice receive them without much trouble; it's lawful for me to kill him, though the Goods be but an Apple, or to the value of five shillings.

70. It's no Murder to kill an Excommunicated person.

71. It's lawful to kill all those who do us wrong, though we be assured that they shall be damned dying in that state.

72. If any person shall endeavour to take away from you your Estate unjustly by foul practices and vexatious Suits at Law; it's lawful for to kill him.

73. A man may lawfully kill by ambush and behind the back an Informer that prosecutes in any Court, and likewise the Witness which the Prosecutor produceth; and also the Judge, if he holds a correspondency with the Witness.

74. If a man hath made use of a woman, he may kill her, if she offer to discover what passed between them.

75. He commits not the sin of Man-slaughter, who kills him who invades him unjustly, though he gave him an occasion to assault him.

76. It's lawful to kill him who sayes to you, *You lie*.

77. An Adulterer may lawfully kill the Husband of a woman with whom he hath committed adultery, if her Husband, having surpris'd him in the fact, doth assault him.

78. It's not against Charity to kill a Thief who robs me of things which I can not recover at Law without much trouble.

79. It's lawful to kill a Slanderer or false witness secretly in an affair where-in not only Life, but even outward Goods also of great importance are in question.

CHAP. IX.

Of Theft.

80. **I**T's no mortal sin in him who steals, that doth believe that his Father, Master, or he from whom he steals the Goods, would have given him them, if he had asked him, or if he had known that he had need of them, or when he makes no account of the Goods which are stolen from them, or when he is of such a disposition that he would not have him that had stolen them from him, obliged therefore to any great punishment.

81. Theft which Men and Maid-Servants commit in Meat and Drink, are not great sins, though insensibly they amount unto a great value.

82. A woman may take and purloyn money from her Husband to Game withal, and upon divers other occasions.

83. The Poor in extraordinary necessity may steal from the Rich with a safe conscience.

84. He who taketh what is anothers, doth him no wrong, if he made no use of it, or was not like to use it.

85. He who steals frequently by little at a time, so to gather together a great Sum, is not obliged to restitution, when it's not done with intention to steal the great Sum.

86. If a man finds any thing which doth belong to another, he may appropriate it to himself though he knows the Owner, and he demands it.

87. It's lawful for Servants to steal from their Masters, to make their Wages proportionable to their Services.

88. A Son may with a safe Conscience steal Money from his Father.

89. A Religious Person or Priest may quit his habit, and go and steal, as well as go *incognito* to the Stews.

CHAP. X.

Of Deceit.

90. **A** Treasurer, Factor, Solicitor or Servant, and such like, may Traffick with their Master's Money, without his privity, and retain the profit for themselves.

91. If a Tax be imposed upon Wine, the Vintner having better Wine then ordinary, to recompence himself may mingle water with wine; and he that buyeth, hath no loss thereby.

92. A Taylor who is employed to make Cloathes for another person, buyes a good Bargain of Cloath of a Merchant of whom he useth to buy, the Taylor may make his benefit of this good pennyworth, and make his Customer pay what it's truly worth.

93. If the Magistrate regulate the Price and Weights of Flesh, and the Measures of Wine, so as the Price is not sufficient for the Charge, Pains, and the wayes of those who sell these Merchandizes; they may diminish the Weight and Measure so far as it's necessary to satisfy all these things; and if they be examined before the Magistrate concerning the same, they may deny all upon oath.

94. If a man hath run into debt to supply his Debaucheries, he may frustrate all his Creditors, and continue to live in Luxury by renouncing his Estate; for he may with safety to his Conscience retain so much thereof, as is necessary for him and his Family to live in honour.

95. If

95. If a man gets Money unjustly, and mingles it with his own, so as they cannot be distinguished the one from the other, by this means he gains to himself the property of the Money, and may justly detain it.

96. Cheating is lawful by the Contract *Moliatra*.

CHAP. XI.

Of Oaths, Promises, Mental Reservations and Equivocations.

97. **I**F a man makes a promise without any intention to promise, or makes a promise without any intention to perform, in neither case he is obliged to perform what is promised, though an oath be superadded, because he had no intent to oblige himself either by his promise or his oath.

98. If you have made a promise or an oath, and you doubt whether you had an intent to oblige your self, it's probable you are not obliged to keep it.

99. To feign in an important matter, and to vow only with one's lips without any intention, is but a venial sin, because it's only to lye, which is no great irreverence towards God.

100. He who desires not to swear (the better to obtain belief) may find out many wayes to speak and to affirm, which commonly passeth for oaths, but indeed are not.

101. When one is resolved to swear, you may choose words of double meaning, and make use of a mental restriction, the better to effect your ends; no man is obliged by his oath beyond his intention, so by consequence if you have no intention to swear, you are not obliged.

102. The art of mental restriction or reservation is of great use, and must be well studied; if a promise by oath be drawn from a man unjustly by force to pay a certain Sum of Money; he that swears in this manner may use an equivocation in these terms, *I swear to you, I will give this Money*, intending to give it to him to whom he swears, or to some other, because these words may receive either of these two Sences.

103. If in the Tongue in which you swear, the Name of God signifies divers things, it will be lawful to swear by the Name of God, taking it in some other signification.

104. When one is required to make oath unto a person in a case in which he believes he is not obliged to swear, he may do it without fear of Perjury, though that he saith be false.

105. If a person be ignorant and cannot make use of mental reservation upon occasion; he may swear plainly without obliging himself in any sort whatsoever, provided he hath no intent to swear, nor to perform that which he swears.

106. This art of Equivocation in the conduct of affairs is of marvellous use, and the Jesuits have given many Rules and Examples for the facilitating of it. If one desires to borrow money of a man, which indeed he hath, but which indeed he will not lend; he may swear he hath it not at all, meaning, not to lend him.

107. It's lawful in our defence at all times to make use of Equivocations, though he who examines us, do's press us, and makes us swear not to use them; yet he may safely make use of them.

108. One is discharged of his Oath, though in doing what he swears to do, he hath an express intent not to do or fulfill it.

109. It's a less sin to swear in common talk by the Holy Name of God, than it's to eat an Egg in Lent.

110. If I swear to do such an act, and have no intention to swear, though I do not perform the act, I am not forsworn, because an Oath depends on the Intention of him who swears.

111. If a man lyes in using Equivocations, without any necessity obliging him thereunto, and swears to confirm this Equivocation, he doth neither lie nor commit perjury, because he that speaks and swears in that sort, hath no intention to speak or swear falsely.

112. If one commit Perjury through natural inadvertency, or because of ill custom he hath to forswear, it's no mortal sin, because he doth forswear himself without perceiving it at all.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Doctrine of Probability.

113. **A** Probable Opinion is that which hath one good Author, of Reputation, or one Reason to maintain it; that which is supported by a probable Opinion is simply good, and we may lawfully and safely in Conscience act by and according to it.

114. Where two Opinions are probable, the one as well as the other, we may justly in the practice prefer that which is less probable; though not so safe, if you like it best, or may be acceptable to others.

115. It's lawful in Conscience for a man to quit his own opinion, though more probable, to follow the probable opinion of another, though less sure.

116. If you meet with two contrary Opinions, you may follow them, both in different affairs, and even in the same affair also, acting and giving contrary counsels now after the one, and then after the other.

117. A man may hold an opinion probable, when he is persuaded that he himself or some other can answer the reasons upon which that Opinion is grounded; and it's safe to act in Conscience accordingly.

118. He who believes that it's more probable, may yet follow it himself, if he believes that it's also probable, that he may follow it.

119. All probable Opinions are of themselves as safe the one as the other; but the more pleasant although they be less probable, are alwayes more profitable and more safe.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Judges and Witnesses.

120. **I**F the Right of the Parties seem equal on both sides, the Judge may take Money or a Present of one Party, to give the advantage to whether he pleaseth.

121. If the Opinions are so doubtful and divided, that it's in the power of the Judge to follow which he pleaseth; if one of the Parties make him a Present to gain him to his side, the Judge doth not offend against Justice to receive that which is given him.

122. A Judge giving his Judgment may follow a probable Opinion, leaving that which is more probable.

123. If there be two probable Opinions, the Judge may give Sentence according to which he pleaseth; and one while he may judge according to one opinion, and another time according to another opinion.

124. A person who hath born false witness through ignorance, who occasioned the loss of life, after he understands the truth, he is not obliged to retract his false testimony, for fear of exposing himself to punishment.

125. It's lawful to kill an innocent person, after we have slandered him, rather than expose our selves to danger by retracting.

126. If a man be accused of a Crime which cannot be legally proved by the Accuser, he may not only deny the crimes, but slander the Accuser, and may impose so many crimes upon him as will be necessary for his defence, and he sinneth not against Justice.

127. A false Witness is he who chargeth one with a false Crime, but an unjust Witness is he who accuseth one of true Crimes, but secret, and which he cannot prove.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Restitution.

128. **I**F any man hath by Merchandize, Usury, or otherwise, being invincibly ignorant, gained a great Estate; though afterward he be informed of the injustice, he is not obliged to restitution.

129. There is no natural Precept which obliges us in this life to make satisfaction for temporal pains.

130. A Sinner may refer Satisfaction without injustice, unto the other life, if he maketh not satisfaction in this.

131. A person who is indebted in great Sums of Money, and gives away part of his Goods, to the prejudice of his Creditors, he to whom the gift is made, is not obliged to restitution.

132. That which one receives for doing of an unjust action, as for bearing of false witness, for killing of a man; he is not subject to restitution.

133. If a Judge hath taken money to give an unjust Judgment, he is not obliged to restitution; but if he hath received money to give a just Judgment, he is obliged to restore what he hath received.

134. If a man wrongeth another out of ignorance or infirmity, he is bound to make restitution.

135. Where a man cannot make restitution without diminishing his retinue or expence, he is not bound to make restitution.

136. Where one hath done wrong to another not by violence, but by Promises, Prayers or Presents; he is not obliged to restitution.

137. A man is not obliged to restore what he hath stolen by trivial and inconsiderable Thefts, whatsoever the total Sum may amount unto.

FINIS.